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During the last decade, the number of runway incursions at airports in the United States 
and worldwide has increased. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed 
the Runway Safety Program (RSP) to address these concerns and improve the safety of 
the National Airspace System (NAS). The purpose of this study was to determine 
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the 
nation’s 5 busiest airports using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the RSP. A 
comparison group interrupted time-series design was used to determine the impact of the 
RSP. A public policy framework served as the theoretical foundation for this study. Data 
were collected from the FAA on runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005 
through September 30, 2014 and assessed for appropriate inclusion criteria. An analysis 
of the dataset using chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests established that though the 
RSP has made progress, it has not effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s 5 
busiest airports. The RSP has decreased the number of runway incursion caused by air 
traffic controllers, reduced the overall severity of runway incursions, as well as positively 
influenced when, during the phase of flight, most runway incursions happen. An increase 
in pilot deviations suggests finding better ways to reduce these type of runway incursions 
is critical, especially with the forecasted growth in air travel. Continued deployment of 
runway safety technology is also important. With increased aviation safety, positive 
social change will occur through enhanced public safety while traveling, safer working 
environments at airports, as well as economic stimulus resulting from increased aviation 
activities benefiting individuals and developing countries throughout the world.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Background 
 Since the Wright Brothers’ first powered aircraft flight on December 17, 1903, 
aviation and air transportation in the United States and throughout the world has 
continued to grow significantly (Grant, 2007). In the 21st century, aviation has become a 
normally accepted part of people’s daily lives. Aviation is defined as the branch of 
science, business, or technology that deals with any part of the operation of machines that 
fly through the air (Aviation, 2012). With all aspects of aviation, inherent risks are 
associated with flight operations, especially when multiple aircraft are involved (Federal 
Aviation Administration [FAA] Flight Standards Service, 2012).  
 One of the most significant risks in aviation is that one aircraft collides with 
another aircraft. This danger is increased when multiple aircrafts are conducting 
operations in close proximity to one another (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012, pp. 3–
6). This risk is further exacerbated when more than one aircraft attempts to concurrently 
use the same active runway. When an aircraft or other vehicles interfere with the 
operation of an aircraft on a particular runway, the potential hazard exists for a runway 
incursion. The FAA (2014d) defined a runway incursion as 
any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft or object on the ground that 
creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking 
off, intending to take off, landing or intending to land within one mile. (p. 1)   
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A runway incursion is a complex event with unlimited reasons to explain its occurrence, 
making it difficult to model a standard runway incursion (Feerar, 2003; Rogerson & 
Lambert, 2012).  
 Runway incursions at the nation’s airports are a growing threat to all of the 
traveling public and have been the cause of accidents in the past (Schonefeld & Moller, 
2012). Air traffic organizations and government administrators have acknowledged a lack 
of effective preventative measures, and more needs to be done to reduce the potential for 
runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 32). The largest threat to airplane 
passengers’ safety occurs not while they are flying, but while they are on the runway 
before or after the actual flight (Ricafort, 2007). Runway incursions have captured the 
continued attention of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) list of “Most 
Wanted” safety improvements for the past decade (FAA Technology Assessment Team, 
2002, p. 5). According to Dickey (2005), runway incursions happen frequently and at 
every airport, creating a risk for pilots, airport employees, and passengers throughout the 
world (p. 1).  
 In the last decade, an increase in the number of runway incursions has occurred in 
the United States (Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA], 2007; Office of the Inspector 
General [OIG], 2014; Pyke, 2007). Speculation exists regarding the reasons for this 
increase in runway incursions. Marroquin (2010) argued that the higher rate of runway 
incursions is a case of mathematics; with more jetliners landing and crossing other 
runways, the chances of a runway incursion increase. The risk of a runway incursion that 
could potentially kill hundreds of people is a developing threat, which will increase in 
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likelihood if the forecasted increases in air traffic occur as predicted in the United States 
during the next 2 decades (ALPA, 2007; FAA, 2013a).  
Runway Incursions are a Global Threat 
 The potential hazards associated with runway incursions are not just a threat in 
the United States, but also worldwide. During 2013, Italy reported a 40% increase in the 
number of runway incursions (Mark, 2014). In an effort to combat the threat of runway 
incursions in their country, Italy’s National Flight Safety Agency (Agenzia Nazionale per 
la Sicurezza del Volo, 2013) issued safety recommendations regarding runway 
incursions. Canada has also reported an increase in their number of runway incursions, 
with an incursion happening almost daily (Campion-Smith, 2013). Because of the 
increasing number of runway incursions, the Canadian Safety Board included runway 
incursions on its list of the most significant transportation problems posing the largest 
risk to the traveling public (Campion-Smith, 2013).  
 The global threat of runway incursions has prompted many countries to seek 
solutions (Nielsen, 2009). Because of the significant number of runway incursions 
occurring throughout Europe, including actual collisions resulting in significant loss of 
life, a European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions was implemented 
(European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation [EUROCONTROL], 2011). In 
this action plan, the inherent dangers associated with runway incursions, their potential 
causes were identified, as well as which mitigating actions may be effective in reducing 
them (EUROCONTROL, 2011). 
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 With the increasing frequency of runway incursions worldwide, many countries 
are developing safety programs designed to reduce the number and inherent threat posed 
by runway incursions (Nielsen, 2009). The International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO, 2014) is a specialized agency of the United Nations and develops international 
Standards and Recommended Practices, which the 191 member countries reference when 
developing their legally enforceable national civil aviation regulations. The ICAO 
established that during the past 5 years, one-third of all aviation accidents were linked to 
runway operations (Werfelman, 2011). Investigators have established a connection 
between growth in air traffic and an increase in runway incursions, demonstrating that a 
traffic increase of 20% could result in as much as a 140% jump in the number of runway 
incursions (Lounsbury, 1999). With air traffic forecast to grow in the United States and 
throughout the world during the next several decades (FAA, 2013a; FAA, 2015), the 
threat of runway incursions and the potential loss of life also increases. 
 The FAA has recognized the danger of runway incursions and has developed a 
program to address these concerns and improve the safety of the National Airspace 
System (NAS). The FAA is the federal agency charged with keeping the NAS in the 
United States operating in a safe and efficient manner (Birtles, Duke, & Sharpe, 2001; 
Dilger, 2003). The FAA has worked toward the reduction of runway incursions through 
the creation and implementation of the Runway Safety Program (RSP). 
The FAA Runway Safety Program  
 The RSP was created on November 1, 2002, pursuant to FAA (2002) Order 
7050.1. The objective of the RSP is the reduction in the number and severity of runway 
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incursions occurring in the United States (FAA, 2008, p. 5). The RSP works to “promote 
technology and improve training, procedures, evaluation, analysis, testing, and 
certification to reduce the risk of runway incursions resulting from errors by pilots, air 
traffic controllers, pedestrians, vehicle operators, tub operators, and individuals 
conducting taxi operations” (FAA, 2008, p. 6). The FAA (2002) Order 7050.1 placed the 
responsibility for the safety program on the newly created Office of Runway Safety, 
requiring it to work with other FAA organizations as well as the aviation community to 
identify and implement activities and technologies designed to increase runway safety (p. 
2).  
 The FAA (2002) Order 7050.1 was amended to improve the reporting of runway 
incursions and also added runway excursions to its coverage. The FAA Order 7050.1A, 
issued on September 16, 2010, modified FAA Order 7050.1 and adopted the ICAO 
definition of a runway incursion, allowing for enhanced worldwide uniform reporting of 
runway incursions. The FAA Order 7050.1B issued on November 11, 2013 modified 
FAA (2010b) Order 7050.1A by expanding the scope of the RSP to include the 
prevention of runway excursions. A runway excursion is defined as “a veer-off or 
overrun off the runway surface” (FAA, 2013b, p. 3).  
 The FAA (2008) 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan established the goals, 
strategies, and objectives for the RSP for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 (p. 5). This 
plan’s strategy was to reduce the frequency of runway incursions and thereby make 
runway incursions of any type rare. Ideally, the underlying strategy of reducing the 
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severity of runway incursions would result in only minor rule infractions instead of near 
aircraft collisions (FAA, 2008, p. 5).  
 Through the 2009–2011 runway safety strategy, the FAA sought a reduction in 
the frequency, type, and severity of runway incursions (FAA, 2008, p. 5). According to 
the FAA (2008), this goal was to be achieved through a vision, a mission, and a set of 
objectives that provide guideposts and milestones (p. 5). As the ultimate outcome is zero 
runway incursions, the FAA focused on corrective actions designed to reduce the 
potential for human error through awareness, outreach, training, technology aids, and 
infrastructure improvements that enhance situational awareness. The continuing efforts 
by the FAA include revisions to procedures, changes to airport geometry, and installation 
of technology and infrastructure designed to mitigate the potential for human error and 
collisions in the high energy segments of the aircraft’s operation (FAA, 2008, p. 5). 
 One emphasis of the 2009–2011 FAA safety plan was to reduce the opportunity 
for aircraft collision risk in the high energy segments of the aircraft’s operation (FAA, 
2008, p. 5). The RSP not only emphasized the importance of the type and severity of a 
particular runway incursion, but also focused on the “phase of the flight” when the 
runway incursion happened during the flight operation (FAA, 2008, p. 5). As part of the 
RSP, each of these three target areas were considered when attempting to reduce runway 
incursions and are relevant in determining whether the 2009–2011 RSP achieved its goals 
and reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.  
 The RSP focused on the elements of airport surface safety, including runway 
incursions and wrong runway departures (FAA, 2008, p. 4). The RSP sought to promote 
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technology; improve training; and enhance the procedures, evaluation, analysis, and 
testing of runway incursions to reduce the safety risk resulting from errors by pilots, air 
traffic controllers, pedestrians, and vehicle operators (FAA, 2008). As air travel is 
expected to increase during the next several decades (FAA, 2013a), a corresponding 
growth will occur in the number of takeoffs and landings (FAA, 2008). Because of 
increased flight operations, the potential for runway incursions will also increase 
(Transport Canada, National Civil Aviation Safety Committee, 2000). Determining 
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has been effective in reducing the type, severity, and, 
when during the phase of flight, the runway incursions happened at the nation’s five 
busiest airports was the objective of this study.  
 Recognizing the need for continued improvement of runway safety, the FAA 
(2008) has used three primary metrics to assess runway incursions: the frequency, the 
severity, and type (p. 7). The FAA identifies frequency as the total number of runway 
incursions within a period of time, severity as how serious a particular runway incursion 
is in relationship to its causing an accident, and type as the description of the nature of the 
runway incursion based on the parties involved (FAA, 2008). The FAA through the RSP 
has invested in programs and technology designed to improve runway safety, asserting 
that the technologies implemented as part of the 2009–2011 National Runway Safety 
Plan would prove successful in reducing the frequency and severity of runway incursions 
(FAA, 2008, p. 15). To assist in the reduction of runway incursions in the United States, 
other governmental agencies have also investigated the potential causes of runway 
incursions as well as the FAA’s policies and procedures for reducing them.  
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Other Governmental Agencies’ Recommendations to Reduce Runway Incursions  
 Interested governmental agencies in the United States have also recognized the 
inherent threat that runway incursions pose to the NAS and have provided the FAA with 
recommendations to reduce runway incursions (FAA, 2008). The 2009–2011 National 
Runway Safety Plan addressed the recommendations from the NTSB, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
for the Department of Transportation (FAA, 2008, p. 15). These governmental agencies 
provided recommendations to the FAA (2008) to help reduce the frequency, types, and 
severity of runway incursions. These recommendations were incorporated into the 2009–
2011 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).  
National Transportation Safety Board  
 The NTSB (2015) is an independent federal agency charged by congress to 
investigate and determine the probable cause of every civil aviation accident in the 
United States. In their July 6, 2000 safety recommendation letter to the FAA, the NTSB 
(2000) suggested that runway incursions could be reduced by making modifications to 
the physical structure at airports as well as procedural changes. These recommendations 
included installation of ground movement safety systems, amending air traffic control 
clearance procedures by requiring all runway crossing be made by explicit air traffic 
control (ATC) instruction (NTSB, 2000, p. 16) and mandating that flight operations 
complete arrival landing distance assessments prior to every landing using existing 
performance data and actual conditions, while ensuring a 15% safety margin (p. 16). 
Though offered by the NTSB in 2000, the FAA did not implement these 
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recommendations into a safety program until their inclusion in the RSP in 2008 (FAA, 
2008).  
Government Accountability Office 
 The U.S. GAO (2015) is an independent agency that investigates, conducts 
evaluations, and performs audits for congress. The GAO performs program reviews and 
analyses and makes recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
federal government (GAO, 2015). In December 2007, the GAO released the Aviation 
Runway and Ramp Safety Report, which provided recommendations to the FAA 
designed to assist in their efforts to reduce runway incursions. The GAO (2007) 
suggested that the FAA use the Office of Runway Safety to lead the agency’s safety 
program, which included preparing a new national runway safety plan, establishing a 
nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting program for air traffic controllers, and developing 
an implementation method to collect data on runway overruns that do not result in 
damage or injury (p. 59). The GAO also suggested that the FAA develop a mitigation 
plan to address controller overtime issues and work with the aviation industry and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to develop methods to collect and 
analyze data regarding ramp accidents as well as develop a strategic plan aimed at 
reducing accidents in the airport’s ramp areas. The FAA incorporated the GAO 2007 
recommendations into their RSP (FAA, 2008). Since the creation and implementation of 
the RSP, the GAO has continued to monitor and provide feedback and recommendations 
designed to assist the FAA in achieving its objective of reduced runway incursions and 
increased aviation safety (GAO, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014).  
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Office of the Inspector General 
 The OIG is a component of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The OIG is an 
independent auditing group responsible for reporting problems and making 
recommendations (based on audits, investigations, and inspections) to the Secretary of 
Transportation and to Congress (OIG, n.d.). In a report on the FAA’s progress in 
reducing runway incursions, the OIG (2010) assessed the actions taken by the agency to 
identify and correct the causes of runway incursions as well as address the issues that 
could affect aviation safety throughout the NAS. The OIG recommended that the FAA 
take actions to help reduce runway incursions. The OIG suggested that the FAA 
introduce initiatives that increase pilot participation in the Runway Incursion Information 
Evaluation Program and (a) analyze data collected to identify and mitigate runway 
incursion causal factors, (b) work with pilots and airline communities to create a process 
for regional RSP managers to request site-specific redacted Aviation Safety Action Plan 
information on runway incursions and surface incidents, and (c) develop an automated 
means to share best practices in reducing runway incursions (OIG, 2010, p. 2). The OIG 
also suggested that the FAA establish benchmarks for implementing JANUS, National 
Air Traffic Professionalism Program and Crew Resource Management training, and 
tower simulator training technologies at airport traffic control towers with a high number 
of runway incursions caused by controller operational errors. In addition, the OIG 
suggested that the FAA require the use of safety risk analysis to evaluate existing 
operational procedures at airports with a potential of runway safety risks and require each 
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line of business to include quantitative goals in its annual business plan for reducing 
runway incursion risks that are specific to oversight responsibilities.  
 The FAA implemented the recommendations made by the NTSB, GAO, and OIG 
as part of their 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan (FAA, 2008). The FAA took the 
following actions: (a) implemented the safety management system (SMS) in the Runway 
Safety Office, (b) created new and improved training and instruction, (c) created the 
FAAS Team that would support the General Airport Surface Incident Mitigation Strategy 
at both the national and regional levels, (d) provided additional outreach throughout the 
United States, (e) enhanced airport infrastructure designed to recognize potential runway 
incursions, and (f) developed technology to aid in the reduction of runway incursions and 
surface incidents (FAA, 2008, pp. 21–25). As a result of these actions, the FAA hoped 
that the number and severity of runway incursions would diminish. According to the U.S. 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team, a combination of technologies could increase a flight 
crew’s situational awareness and improve conflict-alerting capability during ground 
operations, thereby reducing the risk posed by runway incursions by as much as 95% 
(ALPA, 2007).  
 A series of new practices and procedures have been implemented in an effort to 
reduce the number of runway incursions throughout the United States. Although these 
changes have had a positive effect on reducing the likelihood of a runway incursion, 
according to government statistics, the number of runway incursions at U.S. airports 
between 2002 and 2004 remained nearly constant, whereas total air traffic volume 
decreased by 3% (ALPA, 2007). Despite the implementation of risk mitigation 
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techniques and reduced air traffic volume, the FAA has not reduced the rate of runway 
incursions. The Air Line Pilots Association (2007) study was one of the factors that 
prompted the implementation of the RSP (FAA, 2008). 
 The U.S. Department of Transportation OIG in 2014 issued a report critical of the 
FAA’s progress of runway safety issues. The report asserted that more needed to be done 
in curtailing runway incursions at the nation’s airports and stated “Between fiscal years 
2011 to 2013, the number of runway incursions at U.S. airports increased 30 percent, 
despite slight declines in air traffic operations during that time” (OIG, 2014, p. 14). This 
ongoing concern about runway incursions previously caught the attention of the U.S. 
Congress.  
U.S. Congress’ Concerns Regarding Runway Incursions 
 The U.S. Congress also recognized the threat that runway incursions pose to 
aviation safety, especially in light of the anticipated growth in air traffic during the next 2 
decades. On February 14, 2012, the President of the United States signed the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA) of 2012 into law. Section 314 of the Act 
provided direction to the FAA regarding runway safety (FAA, 2012). The act required 
that the FAA administrator provide a strategic runway safety plan to congress. The 
FMRA required that the FAA’s strategic runway safety plan include (a) goals to improve 
runway safety; (b) the near- and long-term actions designed to reduce the severity, 
number, and rate of runway incursions, losses of standard separation, and operational 
errors; (c) time frames and resources needed for the actions described in Clause 2; (d) a 
continual evaluative process to track performance toward the goals referred to in Clause 
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1; and (e) a review with respect to runway safety of every commercial service airport in 
the United States and a proposed action to improve airport lighting, provide better signs, 
as well as improve runway and taxiway markings at those airports (FAA, 2012). The 
FMRA directed the administrator to address the increased runway safety risk associated 
with the expected increase in the volume of air traffic (FAA, 2012).  
 The FMRA (FAA, 2012) directed the FAA’s compliance with applicable 
provisions of the FMRA within a period of 6 months following the act’s passage. The 
administrator must develop a process for tracking and investigating operational errors, 
losses of standard separation, and runway incursions (FAA, 2012). The resulting data and 
report to congress had to include procedures for (a) who is responsible for tracking 
operational errors, losses of standard separation, and runway incursions, including a 
process for lower level employees to report to higher supervisory levels and for frontline 
managers to receive the information in a timely manner; (b) conducting periodic random 
audits of the oversight process; and (c) ensuring proper accountability (FAA, 2012). The 
administrator’s report must also contain a plan for the installation, deployment, and 
integration of safety systems into the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) Implementation Plan, which would alert flight crewmembers and air traffic 
controllers of potential runway incursions (FAA, 2012). 
Significant Growth in Air Travel Predicted Through 2034  
 Aviation forecasts predict a continued and steady growth in air travel with an 
increased number of passengers flying more miles each year during the next 2 decades 
(FAA, 2013a). The FAA has previously measured air travel in terms of revenue 
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passenger miles (RPMs). An RPM (n.d.) represents one paying passenger traveling one 
mile. For U.S. airlines, the agency’s FAA (2013a) Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2014 
to 2034 projected RPM growth to average 208% per year from 2014 through 2034. 
Domestic RPMs are forecast to increase at 2.4% annually, and international RPMs are 
expected to increase by as much as 4.3% annually (FAA, 2013a, p. 80). According to the 
FAA forecast, the total number of people flying on U.S. airlines will increase by .08% 
from 2013 levels to 745.5 million in 2014 and grow to 1.15 billion in 2034 (pp. 14–16). 
With the average percentage of seats filled per flight having reached a record level of 
83.2% in 2013 (FAA, 2013a, p. 16), the anticipated growth in air travel has begun.  
 In addition to the expected increases in passenger travel, air cargo is also expected 
to increase (FAA, 2013a). Air cargo traffic is measured in terms of revenue ton miles 
(RTMs), which represents one ton of cargo flown one mile (RTM, n.d.). Air traffic cargo 
is expected to more than double by 2034 at an average growth rate of 4.1% with load 
factors expected to reach 83.8% in 2034 (FAA, 2014b, p. 2). Landings and takeoffs at 
FAA operated control towers are expected to increase from 49.9 million in 2013 to 61.9 
million in 2034 (FAA, 2014b, p. 2). As the NAS becomes more complex, the FAA looks 
toward new technologies to meet the growing demand for safe and efficient air travel in 
the United States and around the world (FAA, 2014b). 
 With growth anticipated in air traffic as a result of the increasing number of 
passenger and cargo flights, the strain on the NAS will likely increase the potential for 
runway incursions. In addressing these concerns, the FAA has implemented four strategic 
initiatives. These initiatives include (a) raising the bar on safety by using safety 
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management principles to make smarter, risk-based decisions throughout the agency and 
with industry and global stakeholders; (b) rebalancing existing services and modernizing 
the infrastructure, including advancing NextGen, to reduce costs and become more 
efficient in the long run, as the FAA safely integrates new types of users into the nation’s 
airspace; (c) building on the U.S. history of leadership in shaping international standards 
to continue to improve aviation safety and efficiency around the world; and (d) attracting 
and developing the best talent with the appropriate leadership and technical skills to 
undertake the transformation of the U.S. national aviation system (FAA, 2014b, pp. 1–2).  
 The expected growth in air traffic both in the United States and worldwide 
punctuates the need for a method in reducing runway incursions at the nation’s airports.  
The conclusions developed from this research study are significant in determining the 
effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP in reducing the type, severity, and phase of 
flight implications of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.  
The Five Busiest U.S. Airports 
 The FAA uses criteria when determining which airports in the United States are 
the busiest. Historically, the two criteria used by the FAA and in most studies to identify 
the nation’s busiest airports were passenger boardings and aircraft movements. When 
allocating government funds for airports in the United States, the FAA (2014c) uses 
passenger boardings. A passenger boarding is defined as each time a person gets on and 
departs in an aircraft (FAA, 1999). The FAA (2014a) has also used the term hub to 
identify busy commercial service airports. Hubs are categorized by the FAA as large, 
medium, or small (Heymann, Hans-Joachim, & Norbert, 2006). Large hubs are those 
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airports that account for at least 1% of total U.S. boardings (FAA, 2014a). Medium hubs 
in the United States are defined as airports that each account for between 0.25% and 1% 
of the total passenger boardings (FAA, 2014a). Small hubs are defined as airports that 
account for at least 0.05%, but less than 0.25% of total passenger boardings (FAA, 
2014a).  
 Additionally, the FAA tracks the number of aircraft movements at each towered 
airport in the United States. An aircraft movement is defined as either a takeoff or landing 
of an aircraft (FAA, 1999). For this study, FAA data from the last 3 calendar years 
(2011–2013) of passenger boardings and aircraft movements were used to determine the 
five busiest U.S. airports. Consistently, both the total passenger boardings and aircraft 
movements identified the same five busiest U.S. airports. Table 1 displays the FAA’s 




Table 1  
FAA’s Passenger Boardings and Aircraft Movements 
 
Years 




















44,414,121 923,996 45,798,809 930,310 45,308,685 911,074 




31,892,301 878,798 32,171,743 878,108 32,278,906 883,287 




30,528,737 702,895 31,326,268 698,619 32,427,115 614,917 





27,518,358 646,803 28,022,877 650,124 29,018,883 678,059 




25,667,499 628,796 25,799,832 612,567 25,497,348 582,653 
 
 
 The FAA data depicted in Table 1 establishes the five busiest U.S. airports for 
2011 through 2013: (a) Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), (b) 
O’Hare International Airport (ORD), (c) Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), (d) 
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), and (e) Denver International Airport 
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(DEN). With the highest numbers in both passenger boardings and aircraft movements, 
these airports were used in this study to determine if the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has 
reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports.  
Problem Statement 
 Runway incursions continue to create significant safety risks at the nations’ 
airports and will likely increase as air traffic grows during the next several decades 
(FAA, 2015). As the U.S. agency charged with the responsibility for ensuring aviation 
safety (Birtles et al., 2001; FAA, 2010), the FAA (2002, 2008) has implemented a 
program designed to reduce runway incursions. Although the FAA struggles with 
reducing runway incursions, the best ways to accomplish this objective are still not clear. 
Determining whether the FAA’s methods have been reducing runway incursion is a 
question that needs to be addressed. Through this study, I sought to answer this question 
by comparing the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions that have 
occurred at the nation’s five busiest airports before and after the implementation of the 
FAA’s RSP. As such, the problem presented in this research study was whether the 
FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP has reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest 
airports. An increased understanding of the relationship between the types, severity, and 
phases of flight of runway incursions before and after the implementation of the RSP 
provides information that will be helpful in improving the way in which the FAA 
approaches this important safety concern.  
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Purpose of the Study 
Because one of the primary functions of government is to maintain order and 
safety for its citizens (Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle, & Ansolabehere, 2015), ensuring the 
highest levels of safety within the NAS is of importance. I conducted this study to 
determine if modifications need to be made to the FAA’s RSP. If the same types, 
severity, and phase of flight runway incursions are occurring both before and after the 
FAA 2009–2011 RSP report, then changes need to be made to fix the program. The FAA 
has not addressed the effect of their RSP in terms of whether safety has improved in 
relationship to types, severity, and phase of flight of the runway incursions at the nation’s 
five busiest airports. This information is essential to determine whether future runway 
safety programs should be modified.  
I conducted a quantitative study between several significant variables identifiable 
in all runway incursions. According to Creswell (2009), the design of a quantitative 
purpose statement includes the variables in the study and their relationship, the 
participants, and the research site (p. 117). Here, the quantitative analysis method allowed 
me to determine whether the dependent variables (types, severity, and phases of flight) 
occurring before and after (pre vs. post) the implementation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP 
were sufficiently different from one another. The relationship between these variables 
determined whether the FAA RSP reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest 
airports. The results of this study can be used to improve the effectiveness of future 
runway safety programs both in the United States and around the world. Public 
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administrators work to create and improve public policies, which help to improve safety 
and security for its citizens (Lowi et al., 2015). 
The FAA is charged with certificating airports pursuant to Part 139 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FAA, 2016a). To be certificated, the airport must meet established 
safety requirements (FAA, 2016a, p. 1). When these requirements have been achieved 
and approved by the FAA, these airports can legally operate commercial aircraft 
operations. Information resulting from this study will permit the FAA and its public 
administrators to increase as necessary the applicable standards under Part 139, thereby 
ensuring enhanced safety within the NAS. With an improved runway safety program, the 
number, types, and severity of runway incursions should decrease, and the overall safety 
of the nation’s airports should increase, thereby making air transportation safer for the 
flying public. A worldwide reduction in runway incursions is critical in light of the 
forcasted growth in flight operations during the next several decades (FAA, 2015).  
Nature of the Study 
 In this study, I focused on improving aviation safety within the United States and 
throughout the world by reducing the number of runway incursions. By quantitatively 
analyzing data drawn from the FAA’s RSP, I was able to determine whether the FAA 
RSP is reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Using a 
summative effect-based evaluation, I analyzed FAA data of runway incursions to 
determine if any changes in the types, severity, and phase of flight of runway incursions 
occurred before and after the implementation of the RSP. I used a comparison group, 
interrupted time series design (Henry, 2010) for this longitudinal study, as data exists to 
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compare the effect of the 2009–2011 RSP before and after the implementation of the 
RSP. In this manner, the effect of the FAA’s RSP, as well as its applicable policies, were 
determined.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Literature relevant to program evaluation and runway incursions provided the 
basis for the questions and hypotheses of this study. According to Creswell (2009), 
quantitative research questions inquire about the relationship among variables that the 
researcher seeks to better understand (p. 132). I considered the relationship between 
variables occurring before and after the implementation of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP. 
Research Questions 
Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on the 
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
Is there a relationship between the severity of runway incursions that occur on the 
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway incursion 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
Hypotheses 
Ho1: There is no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur 
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 Runway Safety Program. 
Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on 
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
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Ho2: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 Ho3: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.  
Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
Theoretical Base  
According to Kerlinger (1979), a theory is “a set of interrelated constructs 
(variables), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by 
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena” 
(p. 64). A public policy framework served as the theoretical foundation for this study. 
The public policy framework was not only as a guideline for analyzing phenomenon, but 
also a basis for understanding the significance of unusual findings (Knoepfel, Larrue, 
Varone, & Hill, 2011).  
To determine whether the FAA RSP has reduced runway incursions, I made a 
comparison between runway incursions occurring before and after the implementation of 
the RSP. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Holland (1986) established the theoretical 
base for using comparative group design when analyzing the effect of policy and 
programs. Researchers have used impact evaluations using quantitative estimates 
between comparative groups when establishing the causal effects of programs (Henry, 
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2010). More specifically, using an interrupted time-series design (a type of comparative 
group design for measuring the impact of a program) is appropriate for longitudinal 
studies where data exists for before and after the implementation of the program (Henry, 
2010). The interrupted time-series design involves observations of the same variable, 
which is expected to change because of the effect of the program. The FAA data on the 
type, severity, and phase of flight for runway incursions occurring before and after the 
implementation of the RSP were available for analysis. Consistent with the interrupted 
time-series design, I analyzed these variables to determine the effect of the RSP, and I 
established the effectiveness of the RSP in achieving its intended purpose of reducing 
runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports.  
Definition of Terms 
 The following provides definitions for the technical terms, jargon, and other 
special words used in this study.   
 Aerodrome: A defined area on land or water intended to be used either wholly or 
in part for the arrival, departure, and movement of aircraft. The term also includes any 
buildings, installations, and equipment in this area (“Aerodrome,” 2012)   
 Aerospace: The branch of science and technology that deals with travel in the 
space above the surface of the earth. Aerospace includes travel in the atmosphere and in 
the vast regions outside of the earth’s atmosphere (“Aerospace,” 2012).  
 Air traffic control: The control of aircraft traffic from the ground. Air traffic 
control is done from control towers with personnel who direct air traffic in the vicinity of 
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an airport and air route traffic control centers whose personnel direct air traffic along the 
airways between airports (“Air Traffic Control,” 2012).  
 Airport: An area of land or water that is used, or intended to be used, for the 
landing and takeoff of aircraft and includes its buildings and facilities, if any 
(Aeronautics and Space, 1962).  
 Category A (Cat. A): A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly 
avoided (FAA, 2008, p. 27).  
 Category B (Cat. B): Separation decreases and a significant potential exists for 
collision (FAA, 2008, p. 27). 
 Category C (Cat. C): Separation decreases, but ample time and distance exist to 
avoid a potential collision (FAA, 2008, p. 27). 
 Category D (Cat. D): Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion, such 
as incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface 
designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft but with no immediate safety 
consequences (FAA, 2008, p. 27).  
 Commercial aviation operations: Scheduled or charter-for-hire aircraft used to 
carry passengers or cargo. Airlines, air cargo, and charter services typically operate these 
aircraft. The group of aircraft operations includes jet transports and commuter aircraft 
(FAA, 2008, p. 27). 
 General aviation (GA): GA operations encompass the full range of activity from 
student pilots to multihour, multirated pilots flying sophisticated aircraft for business of 
pleasure. This group of aircraft operations include small GA aircrafts (less than 12,500 
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lbs. maximum takeoff weight) and large general aviation aircrafts (maximum takeoff 
weight larger than or equal to 12,500 lbs.). The small GA aircraft tends to be a single-
piloted aircraft, such as a Cessna 152 or Piper Cherokee. A corporate or executive aircraft 
with a two-person flight crew, for example a Cessna Citation C550 or a Gulfstream V, 
represents the large GA aircraft (FAA, 2008). 
 Hot spot: A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential 
risk of collision or runway incursions and in which heightened attention by pilots or 
drivers is necessary (FAA, 2008; International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 
2007).  
 JANUS: JANUS is a technique designed to improve the data collection process for 
operational errors by applying human factors principles to develop interventions to 
enhance performance (FAA, 2008, p. 28). The overall purpose is to understand the role of 
the individual, situation, and work-related factors as they influence air traffic controllers’ 
operational performance. The objectives are to develop an improved understanding of the 
human factors relating to individual performance and the occurrence of operational errors 
and to broaden the role of cognitive factors as they influence the performance of air 
traffic controllers (FAA, 2008, p. 28). 
 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): An independent U.S. federal 
agency that investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant 
accidents in the other modes of transportation conducts special investigations and safety 




 NextGen Implementation Plan: This plan defines the FAA’s path to the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System. NextGen contains funded commitments to new 
operational capabilities; new airport infrastructure; and improvements to safety, security, 
and environmental performance. The plan’s management process ensures these will be 
delivered by a near-term date. The FAA and its partners are also undertaking research, 
policy and requirements development, and other activities to assess the feasibility and 
benefits of additional proposed system changes. The goal of this plan is to turn these 
proposals into commitments and to guide them into use (FAA, 2008, p. 28).  
 Office of the Inspector General (OIG): The OIG has a responsibility to report, 
both to the secretary of transportation and to the congress, program and management 
problems and recommendations to correct them. The OIG carries out these duties through 
a nationwide network of audits, investigations, inspections, and other mission-related 
functions performed by OIG components (FAA, 2008, p. 29).  
 Operational deviation: An occurrence attributable to an element of the air traffic 
system in which applicable separation minima were maintained, but an aircraft, vehicle, 
equipment, or personnel encroached on a landing area that was delegated to another 
position of operation without prior coordinate and approval (FAA, 2008, p. 28).  
 Operational error: An action by an air traffic controller that results in less than 
the required minimum separation between two or more aircrafts or between an aircraft 
and obstacle (e.g., vehicles, equipment, or personnel on runways; FAA, 2008, p. 29).  
 Pilot deviation: An action of a pilot that violates any federal aviation regulation 
(FAA, 2008, p. 29).  
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 Runway incursion: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated 
for the landing and takeoff of aircraft (FAA, 2008, p. 29).  
 Runway incursion error type: Operational error or deviation, pilot deviation, or 
vehicle or pedestrian deviation. These error types are not necessarily an indication of the 
cause of the runway incursion; they typically refer to the last event in a chain of pilot, air 
traffic controller, or vehicle operator actions that led to the runway incursion (FAA, 2008, 
p. 29).  
 Surface incident: Any event in which unauthorized or unapproved movements 
occur in the airport movement area, or an occurrence in the movement area associated 
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight. A surface 
incident can occur anywhere on the airport’s surface, including the runway. The FAA 
further classifies surface incidents as either a runway incursion or a nonrunway incursion 
(FAA, 2008, p. 30).  
 Vehicle/pedestrian deviation: Vehicles or pedestrians entering or moving on the 
runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control that interferes with 
aircraft operations (FAA, 2008, p. 30).  
Assumptions 
 I incorporated several assumptions into this study. The first is that the FAA 
successfully implemented the RSP as the five busiest U.S. airports. This assumption was 
based on the fact that the FAA RSP is a national program charged with ensuring the 
safety of the nation’s air traffic control system. I also assumed that the FAA is focused on 
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improving safety at the nation’s five busiest airports because they constitute the largest 
number of passenger boardings and aircraft movements within the United States (FAA, 
2008).  
Limitations 
 Limitations were associated with this study and its goal of determining whether 
the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP has reduced runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. 
airports. One limitation was that the study was limited to only three dependent 
variables—types, severity, and phases of flight for runway incursions at these airports. 
Although I focused on the three critical elements associated with every runway incursion, 
a broader study considering a larger number of variables could provide even more 
information regarding runway incursions and the FAA’s efforts at reducing them.  
 An additional limitation of this study was that it was specific to the five busiest 
U.S. airports. To address the problem of runway incursion throughout the United States, 
it would be helpful for future researchers to assess all runway incursions at all towered 
airports in the nation. This study only pertained to the five busiest U.S. airports. At these 
five airports, professional pilots working for an airline predominantly conduct large 
commercial aircraft passenger and cargo operations. These complex airport environments 
necessitate that only highly qualified and experienced air traffic controllers are working 
at these five locations. These highly qualified and experienced air traffic controllers and 
predominantly professional pilots are different from the general aviation pilots and air 
traffic controllers who operate at smaller towered airports geographically located 
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throughout the United States. As such, evaluating runway incursions at the nation’s 
busiest airports was different from at many other smaller airports throughout the nation.  
 Reducing runway incursions at these other towered airports is also important as a 
part of reducing runway incursions throughout the United States. Because these smaller 
airports, which primarily accommodate general aviation aircraft, involve fewer passenger 
boardings as well as aircraft movements, they are different from the flight operations that 
occur at the nation’s five busiest airports. As such, the results of this study do not present 
an accurate measure of the effectiveness of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP across the nation 
at all towered airports. Future researchers should address these smaller towered airports 
located throughout the United States.  
Delimitations 
 I addressed whether the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP reduced runway incursions at the 
nation’s five busiest airports; but, several significant delimitations existed. Delimitations 
are restrictions within a study because of its design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). I 
addressed runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Although runway 
incursions can occur at any airport, this study pertained to the five busiest U.S. airports. 
These five busiest airports represent a significant portion of the air traffic occurring 
within the nation (FAA, 2014c). This study was further delimited by the fact that I sought 
a correlation between only three elements associated with any particular runway 
incursion. Specifically, I analyzed the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway 
incursions both before and after the FAA’s RSP. Although a number of factors could 
influence the occurrence of any given runway incursion, I addressed only these three 
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elements. Finally, I explored runway incursions occurring only 3 years before and 3 years 
after the 2009–2011 RSP. Although runway incursions occurred during the pendency of 
the 2009-2011 RSP, these runway incursions were not included in this study. Each of 
these delimitations may have curtailed the results of this study.   
Significance of the Study 
 Runway incursions are a problem with global implications. Although the FAA has 
worked through the RSP to reduce the number of runway incursions, the effectiveness of 
the RSP at reducing runway incursions in regard to their type, severity, and phase of 
flight remain unclear. Through this study, I sought to draw a correlation between runway 
incursions’ type, severity, and phase of flight at the nation’s five busiest airports. I chose 
to study the five busiest airports in this study because they represent approximately 25% 
of the nation’s air traffic (FAA, 2014c), and the FAA has focused a significant portion of 
its financial and technological resources at reducing runway incursions and increasing 
safety as these airports (FAA, 2008). By increasing the understanding of the correlation 
between these variables before and after the implementation of the FAA’s 2009–2011 
RSP, I developed a more focused picture of the influence of the FAA’s RSP. The FAA’s 
limited resources can be more effectively allocated in a manner that will result in an 
increased effect on the improvement of aviation safety within the United States and 
throughout the world.  
 I addressed the question of whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced the number 
of runway incursions at the nation’s busiest airports. This study fills a gap in the literature 
associated with runway incursions in that it involved analysis of runway incursions from 
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more than just a numerical perspective; I additionally considered runway incursions 
regarding the type and severity during the phase of flight when it occurred. Not all 
runway incursions have the same level of safety implications to the flying public (FAA, 
2008). The information garnered from this study provides decision makers with an 
increased understanding of the effectiveness of the methods employed by the FAA to 
reduce runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This knowledge will assist 
the FAA, foreign governments, and other stakeholders in improving their aviation safety 
programs designed to reduce runway incursions. By improving their runway safety 
programs, the overall safety of the air travel system throughout the world will improve, 
thus creating positive social change by improving human and social conditions relating to 
air travel.  
 I evaluated the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest U.S. 
airports. The conclusions drawn from this study will assist in reducing runway incursions 
and, thereby, help improve the overall safety of the NAS as well as air traffic operations 
around the world. Making aviation globally safer and reducing the risk for aviation 
accidents for the flying public supports positive social change.  
Implications for Social Change 
Positive social change includes improving the quality of life for members of a 
society through means of social, political, and economic modification. Aviation has 
presented risks for the flying public throughout the world, including the potential for 
serious injury and death (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012). A runway incursion 
represents a safety risk, which could jeopardize the safety of those using aviation as a 
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means of travel (FAA, 2014d). By reducing runway incursions and decreasing the 
inherent safety risks associated with aviation, society benefits in several significant ways.    
People are more frequently using aviation as a means to travel from one place to 
another. Aviation within the United States and around the world is expected to continue 
to grow during the next several decades (FAA, 2015). As the number of flight operations 
continues to increase, the inherent risk of a potential runway incursion also increases 
(FAA, 2013a). As larger numbers of people travel, keeping these individuals safe is of 
primary importance for all government and aviation stakeholders. Additionally, avoiding 
aviation accidents has the potential of decreasing the overall cost of traveling within the 
aviation system (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014), which would allow a larger 
number of people throughout the world to travel by air.  
 Aviation also helps to stimulate the economies of many countries throughout the 
world (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014). Tourism, air transport of goods, and 
many aviation jobs are dependent on the safe operation of the aviation system (Air 
Transportation Action Group, 2014, p. 2). Reducing the potential for runway incursions 
and enhancing aviation safety will help improve the inherent safety of air traffic 
operations throughout the world (FAA, 2014d) and support the growth and further 
development of aviation. I identified whether the methods used by the FAA are reducing 
runway incursions. This knowledge can be applied throughout the world when 
developing and improving aviation safety systems designed to reduce runway incursions 
globally. The implications resulting from this study have the potential of increasing 
aviation safety, saving lives, and promoting positive social change. Ultimately, the results 
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of this study will help decision makers worldwide make the right decisions when it comes 
to how best to reduce runway incursions and improve aviation safety.  
Chapter Summary 
 Solving runway incursions in the United States and around the world is not a 
simple task. Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the research problem presented in this 
dissertation. The chapter also provided a summary of the current studies in the area of 
runway incursions, the underlying theoretical support for the study, and relevant 
assumptions and limitations. I explored the nature and purpose of this study and 
described how this study effectively to the body of knowledge in runway incursions and 
aviation safety, thereby improving the overall safety of NAS and promoting positive 
social change. Chapter 2 includes a review of the literature pertaining to this study. 
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the research design, including a description of the data 
collection, the research procedure, and the statistical analysis used in the study. Chapter 4 
provides the findings and the analysis of the collected data. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 I designed this study to evaluate whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced 
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This literature review includes an 
exploration of literature on runway safety and the effect of runway incursions on aviation 
safety. The aviation safety literature reviewed relates to runway safety on various 
concerns and approaches for analyzing and improving runway safety within the United 
States and throughout worldwide.  
 Governmental organizations, aviation stakeholders, and academics have 
developed aviation safety literature in recent years. Aviation safety and more particularly, 
runway safety, has been a continuing concern of the world’s governments, which seek to 
improve the safety of their own countries’ aviation systems and operations. Because 
governmental entities manage most runway safety programs, I first explored the literature 
produced by governmental organizations. Next, I explored literature produced primarily 
within the last 10 years by aviation stakeholders seeking improved aviation safety. I then 
analyzed academic literature relating to runway safety in this context. GoogleScholar, 
Academic and Business Premier were databases used to search for literature with key 
search terms including aviation, airport, air traffic, safety, runway, general aviation, 
runway incursion, operational error, pilot deviation, and government program 
evaluation. This literature review concludes with an analysis of the literature on 
government program evaluation, with an emphasis on impact evaluations using 
comparison group, interrupted time-series design. A basic understanding of government 
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program evaluation methodologies is instrumental in appreciating the quantitative 
research methodology used in the data analysis of runway incursions at the nation’s five 
busiest airports.  
Governmental Aviation Safety Literature     
 Government literature created by a governmental agency or alternatively a study 
directed by a governmental agency addresses the significance of runway incursions and 
their potential disastrous implications on the NAS. In the United States, the FAA 
predominately created these reports, as well as other interested federal government 
agencies, such as the NTSB, GAO, OIG, and the Department of Transportation. These 
governmental agencies have recognized the threat that runway incursions pose to the 
nation’s NAS and have provided the FAA with recommendations to reduce runway 
incursions. The FAA’s 2009–2011 National Runway Safety Plan addressed the 
recommendations from the NTSB, the U.S. GAO, and the OIG for the Department of 
Transportation (FAA, 2008, p. 15). Each of these governmental agencies, after 
conducting independent studies, provided recommendations to the FAA to reduce the 
frequency, types, and severity of runway incursions (FAA, 2008, p. 15). These 
recommendations were incorporated into the FAA 2009–2011 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).  
National Transportation Safety Board  
 The NTSB (2015) is an independent federal agency charged by congress to 
investigate and determine the probable cause of every civil aviation accident in the 
United States. In their July 6, 2000, safety recommendation letter to the FAA (NTSB, 
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2000), the NTSB suggested that runway incursions could be reduced if the FAA took the 
following actions, 
  Require all airports to provide scheduled passenger service and install a 
ground movement safety system that would provide direct warnings to 
flight crews regarding potential runway incursions (NTSB, 2000, p. 16).  
  Amend Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations §91.129(i) (Aeronautics and 
Space, 1962) to require that all aircraft runway crossings be authorized 
only by ATC instructions or clearances, and further ensure that all 
personnel assigned to move aircrafts and pilots operating aircrafts receive 
adequate notification of the change in ATC procedures (NTSB, 2000, p. 
16). 
  Amend FAA Order 7110.65 involving air traffic control procedures that 
require aircrafts crossing multiple runways be issued ATC crossing 
instructions for each runway after the aircrafts have crossed the previous 
runway (NTSB, 2000, p. 16). 
  Mandate that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135 and 91 
(Aeronautics and Space, 1962), as well as Subpart K aircraft operators 
conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based 
on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a 
minimum safety margin of at least 15% (NTSB,  2000, p. 16). 
 Each of these actions was designed to reduce runway incursions by modifying or 
implementing new procedures, which the NTSB believed would be beneficial in 
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increasing aviation safety within the NAS through the reduction of runway incursions. 
Though the NTSB suggested these recommendations in 2000, the FAA first implemented 
these in their 2008 RSP (FAA, 2008, p. 15).  
Government Accountability Office 
 The U.S. GAO (2015) is an independent federal agency that investigates, 
conducts evaluations, and performs audits for congress. The GAO investigates how 
government agencies spend taxpayer monies to achieve their mandated duties. The GAO 
has performed numerous evaluations of the FAA’s aviation safety programs and its 
continuing efforts to improve the safety of the NAS. These evaluations have helped in 
shaping the course that the FAA has taken in its endeavors to reduce runway incursions at 
the nation’s airports.  
 In December 2007, the GAO released its report providing guidance to the FAA 
regarding the agency’s efforts to reduce runway incursions. The GAO (2007) developed 
its findings through a review of runway and ramp safety data, interviews conducted with 
industry experts and FAA officials, as well as surveys of aviation experts (pp. 61–79). 
The GAO findings were critical of the FAA’s methods for reducing runway incursions 
(GAO, 2007). The GAO report made five recommendations to positively influence the 
FAA’s efforts to reduce runway incursions throughout the United States (GAO, 2007).  
1. Create of an Office of Runway Safety that would develop and implement a 
new national runway safety plan;  
2. Create a nonpunitive voluntary safety reporting system to encourage air 
traffic controllers to disclose operational errors and deviations;  
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3. Collect data on runway overruns by aircraft that do not result in damage or 
injury to analyze trends and causes of these types of incidents;  
4. Develop a plan for handling air traffic controllers overtime issues, which 
focus on shift changes and incentives, to encourage transfers to locations 
with higher volumes of traffic thereby necessitating significant rates of 
controller overtime; and  
5. Enhance collaboration with the aviation industry and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration to develop methods to collect and 
analyze ramp accidents and, if necessary, create a strategic plan designed 
to reduce accidents involving passengers, workers, as well as the aircraft 
in airport ramp areas. (GAO, 2007, p. 59)   
Each of these recommendations was implemented by the FAA when developing its RSP 
(FAA, 2008).  
 The GAO continued its audits of the FAA’s efforts to improve aviation safety and 
reduce runway incursions (GAO, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014). The 
GAO (2008a) found that the FAA’s progress on reducing runway incursions had been 
impeded by a lack of leadership, challenges involving technology implementation, and 
other problems. The GAO findings were based on surveys of experts regarding the causes 
and measures to mitigate accidents, review of relevant safety data, and interviews of 
industry and FAA officials (GAO, 2008a, p. 1). With knowledge of the increasing NAS 
congestion and recent data indicating that runway incursions serve as precursors of 
aviation accidents, the GAO (2008a) found that more needed to be accomplished by the 
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FAA to reduce runway incursions (p. 1). Although the FAA has taken steps to reduce 
runway incursions, a lack of leadership and coordination, technology challenges, data 
limitations, as well as human factors have impeded the agency’s progress (GAO, 2008, p. 
1). The GAO (2008a) found the development of leadership, overcoming technology 
challenges and data limitations, as well as resolving human factors as measures necessary 
for the FAA to overcome to achieve its runway safety goals (p. 13).  
 The GAO (2008b) found that even though the FAA had worked toward achieving 
its goal of reducing runway incursions within the United States, the agency’s continued 
efforts through changing airport layouts, improving runway signage, modifying airport 
lighting and markings, as well as developing and implementing new technology designed 
to increase situational awareness were essential for continued safety improvement (pp. 1–
2). The GAO (2008b) found that even though the FAA had implemented several methods 
for scheduling air traffic controller shift changes to overcome human factor implications, 
air traffic controllers were hesitant to self-report operational errors and deviations when 
the possibility of discipline existed (p. 16). Additionally, air carriers have taken steps to 
reduce the potential for runway incursions by educating their pilots on cockpit 
distractions and how to avoid them (GAO, 2008b). The NTSB and the FAA have also 
acknowledged that runway status lights (RWSL) would be helpful in reducing runway 
incursions at the nation’s airports. The GAO noted that although the FAA had been 
making progress to improve aviation safety, more still remained to be accomplished.  
 The GAO (2009) emphasized the importance of adequate and predicable funding 
for the FAA to accomplish its safety goals. Using generally accepted government 
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auditing standards through discussions with senior FAA officials and aviation industry 
representatives, the GAO specified six primary areas of importance for increased aviation 
safety and the continued development of a safer NAS. These areas of primary importance 
included (a) NextGen: implementing existing and current technologies while providing 
incentives for the acquisition of these technologies for airlines as well as enhancing 
runways, thereby exploiting the advantages of NextGen technologies (GAO, 2009, pp. 1–
2); (b) safety: the FAA should increase aviation oversight, especially of runway and ramp 
areas, through the use of improved aviation safety data (pp. 3–4); (c) mobility: the FAA 
should decrease congestion through an increase of NAS capacity by reducing delays with 
redesigned airspace and limiting flight operations (pp. 5–6); (d) environment: the FAA 
should work on reducing emissions, noise, and other pollutants (pp. 7–8); (e) human 
capital: the FAA should develop a fully trained workforce capable of implementing the 
demands required by NextGen (pp. 9–10); and (f) timely reauthorization: timely 
reauthorizations of FAA funding is essential to support continuing programs and ensure 
the successful implementation of the NextGen provisions (pp. 11–12). Congress’ FAA 
funding reauthorization occurred in 2012 (FAA, 2012).  
 The GAO (2012a) credited the FAA with taking the steps to improved aviation 
safety data, but indicated that aviation safety risks still required immediate attention. The 
GAO reached the conclusions in their report by reviewing earlier GAO work as well as 
the actions of the FAA in response to the earlier GAO (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) 
aviation safety reports. In their report, the GAO (2012a) noted that in 2010, Congress 
passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act, which addressed concerns 
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for reducing safety risks through more effective FAA management. In responding to 
congress’ concerns, the FAA has worked to implement new safety programs and used the 
SMS, a risk-based aviation safety approach that incorporates data that helps in the 
creation of effective policies, procedures, and accountabilities (GAO, 2012a, p. 13). The 
GAO (2012a) suggested that the FAA focus increased attention on improving the quality 
of its data, while recognizing that more work in aviation safety remained to be 
accomplished by the FAA (p. 14).  
 In late 2012, congress requested that the GAO (2012b) perform an analysis of the 
trends in general aviation accidents that have occurred between 1999 and 2011. These 
trends, which included runway incursions, affect the overall safety of the NAS (GAO, 
2012b, pp. 1–2). The GAO (2012b) developed its findings using generally accepted 
government auditing standards through an analysis of NTSB accident data, interviews of 
NTSB officials, members of the FAA and industry stakeholders, as well as a review of 
government and industry studies (p. 37). In addition to the implementation of new 
technologies, the GAO concluded that to improve general aviation safety, the FAA 
required higher quality data of general aviation flight hours. The FAA was further 
encouraged to establish general aviation performance measures necessary for the 
development of a 5-year general aviation safety strategy (GAO, 2012b). As the 
importance of general aviation on the NAS continues to increase, an increased FAA 
understanding and effective regulation of general aviation is necessary for reducing 
runway incursions and improving aviation safety throughout the NAS.  
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 The GAO (2013) concluded that the FAA does not have a comprehensive risk-
based process for the effective reporting of aviation safety issues. The GAO  
recommended that the FAA implement improved data collection methods and analysis 
focused on runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, and the development of 
more information regarding general aviation flight hours and training (GAO, 2013, pp. 4–
5). Although the GAO (2013) recognized that the FAA has moved toward higher levels 
of safety, the agency still faces challenges in other aviation safety areas (pp. 5–10).  
 The GAO (2014) reviewed SMS implementation progress at the FAA and within 
the aviation industry. The GAO explored the challenges affecting the implementation of 
SMS and received recommendations from stakeholders regarding how the deployment of 
SMS could be enhanced (GAO, 2014, pp. 1-3). The GAO (2014) used generally accepted 
government auditing standards when conducting research through the review of FAA 
documents and interviewing FAA officials and 20 selected aviation stakeholders, 
including air carriers, repair stations, manufacturing firms, and certificated airports (pp. 
31–34). The GAO established that confusion still existed by stakeholders regarding the 
SMS oversight strategy. Many aviation safety inspectors needed additional training in 
SMS procedures as well as an improved understanding of the agency’s procedures so that 
consistent interpretation would occur with regulatory enforcement (GAO, 2014). The 
GAO found that stakeholders believed that the FAA’s collaboration and training were 
good, but could be improved and that SMS training provided by the FAA for 
stakeholders would be helpful. The GAO (2014) recommended that the FAA establish a 
plan for SMS implementation with a plan for the training and guidance of the agency’s 
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aviation safety inspectors while they perform their regulatory duties. Accomplishing the 
efficient implementation of SMS would serve as a tool for further reduction of runway 
incursions and an increase in aviation safety throughout the NAS.  
Office of the Inspector General 
 The OIG is a component of the U.S. Department of Transportation and an 
independent auditing group responsible for reporting problems and making 
recommendations (based on audits, investigations, and inspections) to the secretary of 
transportation and to congress (OIG, n.d.). In a report on the FAA’s progress toward the 
reduction of runway incursions, the OIG (2010) assessed the actions taken by the agency 
to identify and correct the underlying causes of recent runway incursions as well as 
address those issues that could affect aviation safety throughout NAS. The OIG 
recommended that the FAA take six actions to help in the nationwide reduction of 
runway incursions: 
  Establish initiatives to promote increased voluntary pilot participation in 
the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program and ensure the 
analysis of data collected to identify and mitigate runway incursion causal 
factors; 
  Collaborate with the pilot and airline communities to establish a process 
whereby regional RSP managers can request site-specific redacted 
Aviation Safety Action Plan information on runway incursions and surface 




  Develop an automated means to share local best practices that were 
successful in reducing runway incursions; 
  Establish appropriate milestones for implementing JANUS, National Air 
Traffic Professionalism Program and Crew Resource Management 
training, and tower simulator training technologies at airport traffic control 
towers that have a history of a high number of runway incursions caused 
by controller operational errors;   
  Require a safety risk analysis to evaluate existing operational procedures 
at airports where the FAA has identified potential runway safety risks and 
train appropriate personnel in conducting such analysis; and 
  Require each line of business within the FAA to include quantitative goals 
in its annual business plan for reducing runway incursion risks specific to 
oversight responsibilities. Designate the Runway Safety Office as the 
authority to review and approve all runway safety initiatives. (OIG, 2010, 
p. 2).  
The OIG’s (2010) recommendations promote increased collaboration between 
aviation industry stakeholders and encourage improved safety risk analysis, better 
training, and the sharing of best practices designed to increase aviation safety and reduce 
runway incursions at the nation’s airports.  
International Governmental Runway Incursion Literature 
 In addition to the literature provided by federal government agencies, 
international governmental organizations have also been helpful through their efforts to 
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reduce runway incursions. These international organizations represent the many countries 
that have struggled to reduce runway incursions occurring within their nations. Their 
efforts have led to the development of literature regarding the global threat and 
worldwide challenge seeking the reduction of runway incursions and increasing aviation 
safety. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2004) concluded that a majority of 
runway incursions were because of communication problems between the air traffic 
controller and another party, most often the pilot. The ICAO (2002), a component of the 
United Nations, emphasized human factors and organizational issues of airline 
maintenance operations and how such improved procedures could be beneficial in 
reducing runway incursions throughout the world. The ICAO’s engagement in this 
endeavor has also served as a catalyst for other organizations’ safety efforts.  
 The International Air Transport Association (2006) examined the human, 
technical, environmental, and organizational components associated with its accident 
classification system and underlying aviation risk assessment. Although researchers have 
evaluated the ways to reduce the number of runway incursions, several have specifically 
focused on reducing runway incursions by applying technological advancements 
(Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld & Moller, 2012).  
Nongovernmental Aviation Safety Literature 
 In several nongovernmental aviation safety studies, researchers have concluded 
that major U.S. airports are operating with unacceptable levels of risk because of their 
inherent potential for runway incursions and their failure to adequately address these 
safety concerns (ALPA, 2007; NTSB, 2010). Skorupski (2010) established that air 
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transport is a complex system that must effectively combine advanced technical systems, 
operators (air traffic controllers and pilots), and procedures (p. 45). Historically, aviation 
safety risk has been identified by the number of aircraft accidents, which typically results 
in a large number of casualties and huge financial loses for those involved (Skorupski, 
2010, p. 45). Because of the significant exposure which could result from an aviation 
accident, safety has remained an essential component in air transportation (Skorupski, 
2010).  
 According to Skorupski (2010), the risks inherent in air traffic can be separated 
into conscious and unconscious. Conscious risk occurs when, despite the possibility of 
avoiding it, someone decides to engage in a risky action (Skorupski, 2010). Meanwhile, 
unconscious or passive risk occurs independently of anyone’s will or decision 
(Skorupski, 2010). Dependent on the nature and duration of the inherent safety threat, an 
operator may have to deal with continuous, single, or cumulative risks. Air traffic 
accidents are generally characterized with respect to risk and have several distinctive 
features: (a) aircraft crew members and passengers are the most vulnerable to risk; (b) 
accidents are rare events but have serious consequences; and (c) risk is always present in 
aircraft operations and requires that noncumulative risk be properly addressed 
(Skorupski, 2010, pp. 46–47).  
 Managing risk and safety effectively is a practical problem, which has historically 
been addressed by examining the underlying causes of incidents and accidents, 
identifying the risks associated with them, and then determining appropriate safety 
standards consistent with socially acceptable values (Skorupski, 2010, p. 47). According 
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to Skorupski (2010), a number of methods and models exist to consider the different 
aspects of risk inherent in air transportation. The most advanced methods and models 
frequently used involved studying the causes of actual incidents and accidents. A second 
group of methods and models focused on the theoretical risk of possible collisions in air 
transportation. A third group of methods and models focused on human error analysis, 
which occurs because of errors by air traffic controllers and pilots. The fourth and final 
group of risk analysis methods focused on third-party risk methods, which involve 
considering the statistical risk of losing human life while on the ground through an 
aircraft accident as compared to the inherent risk associated with the aircraft passenger 
(Skorupski, 2010, p. 47).  
 Skorupski (2010) established that air traffic accidents are most often a 
combination of many different factors. Skorupski (2010) focused his analysis on 
evaluating only those additional factors that determine the creation of the accident for the 
purpose of determining the statistical dependencies between a serious incident and the air 
accident (p. 47). Skorupski concluded that it would be possible to estimate the number of 
accidents solely based on the knowledge of the number of incidents on the presumption 
that a serious incident results in an accident through only one additional adverse event (p. 
53). As such, Skorupski asserted that a realistic forecasting model can be developed to 
identify that number of accidents based on the number of incidents (serious incidents) 
occurring in air traffic (p. 53).  
 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; 2005), FAA (2009), 
and European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL; 2010) 
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concluded that the Runway Incursion Prevention and Alerting System (RIPAS) has the 
potential to significantly decrease the number of runway incursions, thereby decreasing 
the overall risk of an aviation accident (Jones & Prinzel, 2011). Some researchers have 
concluded that even with RIPAS installations, general aviation will still pose an 
unacceptable risk, affecting runway safety at many airports (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). 
Although an open question appears to exist regarding the eventual effect of RIPAS 
(Chapin, 2010), the experience from the deployment of RWSL and the final approach 
runway occupancy signal (FAROS) have established that direct visual clues at airports 
significantly improve an airport’s overall runway safety (FAA, 2009).  
 Aviation safety literature supports the conclusion that new technologies could 
have a beneficial effect on the reduction of runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller, 
2012). However, many of these technologies are expensive and require a significant 
capital investment. Horowitz and Santos (2009) explored how policy makers could 
approach technological improvements designed to cost-effectively improve runway 
safety at their respective airports (p. 357). The objective of the Horowitz and Santos’ 
(2009) study was to identify the best ways to install technological improvements while 
decreasing the rate of runway incursions and ensuring that current airport safety levels 
are not adversely affected (p. 357). Utilizing a case study approach, Horowitz and Santos 
(2009) concluded that the best way in which to introduce technological improvements 
into an operational airport environment was by using the new technology initially as a 
secondary airport safety system, which could then assist in the reduction of runway 
incursions while still maintaining acceptable levels of airport safety (Horowitz & Santos, 
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2009, p. 357). In this manner, effective data collection regarding the technological 
improvement could occur without increased risk to overall aviation safety (Horowitz & 
Santos, 2009, p. 360).  
 The causal relationship between human factors and the occurrence of runway 
incursions at the nation’s airports has been the central focus of several aviation safety 
studies (Chang & Wong, 2012; International Air Transport Association, 2006; Rantanen, 
Palmer, Wiegmann, & Musiorski, 2006). These studies have consistently concluded that 
human error serves as a significant factor in most runway incursions.  
 Rantanen, Palmer, Wiegmann, and Musiorski (2006) identified human error as a 
consistent and primary factor resulting in aviation accidents (p. 1221). The International 
Air Transport Association (2006) concluded that a pilot’s years of flying, flying hours 
and flying skills has an influence on their likelihood of having a runway incursion. Chang 
and Wong (2012) analyzed runway incursions from the human perspective, concluding 
that most runway incursions are the result of human error and that statistically pilot 
deviations are the most significant causal factor in a majority of runway incursions (p. 
25), with pilot error the primary cause of most runway incursions (p. 30). The FAA data 
supported Chang and Wong’s conclusions that nearly 72% of runway incursions involve 
pilot deviations while operating as general aviation aircraft (Chang & Wong, 2012, p. 
25). As a result of their findings, Chang and Wong (2012) created a model for analyzing 
human risk factors designing it as an effective tool to reduce runway incursions (p. 25).  
 Chang and Wong’s (2012) model established an overall ranking and relative 
weighting of dimensions of the top 10 pilot risk factors resulting in runway incursions. 
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These factors included (a) situational awareness, (b) runway/taxiway marking and signs, 
(c) safety attitude, (d) communication between pilot and air traffic controller, (e) 
communication skills, (f) fatigue/incapacitation, (g) pilot’s cross-check, (h) instruction 
and read back between pilot and ATC, (i) airport illumination, and (j) runway incursion 
prevention systems (Chang & Wong, 2012, p. 28). Each of these risk factors frequently 
play a critical role in an eventual runway incursion.  
 Using Chang and Wong’s (2012) model to identify areas of potential runway 
incursions on an airport by effectively identifying those pilot risk factors that could 
potentially reduce runway incursions, thereby decreasing the number of potential runway 
incursion accidents and reducing the risk of fatalities and financial lost by the airlines (p. 
30). Chang and Wong also determined that there were significant differences between the 
pilots’ viewpoints of those risk factors likely to result in runway incursions as compared 
to the viewpoints of airline management experts. Pilots considered operational 
deviations/negligence, a lack of teamwork and pilot fatigue as critical factors, while 
airline management experts considered decision making ability, flight dynamics surface 
guidance systems and runway incursion prevention systems as the primary factors 
leading to runway incursions (Chang & Wong, 2012, p. 29). Pilots generally focused on 
their core ability to interact with others, whereas airline management experts emphasize 
the failure of ineffective interaction between pilots and hardware (Chang & Wong, 2012, 
p. 29). From the experts’ viewpoint, most runway incursions could be most effectively 
avoided with enhanced hardware assistance and improved liveware (Chang & Wong, 
2012, p. 29).  
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 A system organization perspective has been utilized to understand the factors 
influencing aviation safety as well as the causes and potential solutions of runway 
incursions at the nation’s airports (Adam, Lentz, & Blair, 2002; Rogerson & Lambert, 
2012). Adam, Lentz, and Blair (2002) studied factors claimed as positively influencing 
the likelihood of a runway incursion occurring under a given set of circumstances. These 
factors varied significantly in type and included such components as runway layout, 
airport identifications, signage as well as the methods utilized for navigation and 
communications among pilots, drivers, and controllers (Adam et al., 2002). Rogerson and 
Lambert (2012) established a method for distinguishing levels of risk across a set of 
locations on an airport utilizing multiple factor hierarchies (p. 22). This method avoids 
averaging across experts and is thus useful for situations in which experts disagree and in 
which an absence of expert consensus on the causative or contributing factors are 
significant for risk management purposes (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 23). Rogerson 
and Lambert’s research findings established that using experts’ perspectives on the 
airport-specific factors could actually contribute to runway incursions. Their study 
involved the analysis of 80 towered airports in the United States where experts identified 
and weighed the relative influence of factors such as: airport geometry, operations, 
weather, geography and the number of days since the last safety review in determining 
the likelihood of a future runway incursion (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 22). By 
analyzing these factors, a prediction of the relative likelihood of a runway incursion 
occurring at a particular location could be effectively calculated (Rogerson & Lambert, 
2012, p. 23).  
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 Through their detailed factor analysis, Rogerson and Lambert (2012) expanded 
the scope of their research and developed a methodology for identifying, organizing, and 
aggregating potential risks to a safety-critical system that could then be used to create a 
protocol for the prioritization of protections against airport safety hazards (pp. 22–23). 
Rogerson and Lambert’s (2012) methodology was designed to avoid the acceptance of 
unfounded expert views by highlighting the effects of multiple complementary 
perspectives on system organization while addressing the process of decision-making 
under stakeholder-specific assessments of risk factor relationships (p. 23). Ultimately, 
this modeling process could be effectively applied to a particular case study where more 
productive training meetings would occur which were specifically designed to improve 
the local airport runway safety environment (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012). As such, 
Rogerson and Lambert asserted that particular airport runway safety problems could be 
effectively resolved by identifying the indicator and causative factors and then 
prioritizing which airports warrant special training or intervention by the program safety 
office. In this manner, limited government resources could be more efficiently allocated 
to those airports and locations where the resulting outcome would be more significant 
(Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Those areas identified on an airport where a runway 
incursion would be more likely to occur were called “hot spots” (Rogerson & Lambert, 
2012, p. 25).  
 The concept of airport hot spots was a reflection on a similar concept within the 
federal highway system, commonly referred to as “conflict points” (Federal Highway 
Administration, 2010). Conflict points are locations where traffic accidents are more 
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likely to occur, likewise hot spots are locations on airports where runway incursions or 
accidents are more likely to happen (Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Because each 
hot spot presents a potential location for a runway incursion, the higher the number of hot 
spots at a particular airport, the higher the likelihood of a runway incursion (Rogerson & 
Lambert, 2012, p. 25). Rogerson and Lambert (2012) further identified those factors that 
would have an effect on the likelihood of a runway incursion (p. 26). These factors 
included such aspects as airport culture, management style and method of communication 
(Rogerson & Lambert, 2012, p. 26). Rogerson and Lambert (2012) organized 23 runway 
incursion factors into a seven factor hierarchy to account for varying perspectives among 
stakeholders on the particular emphasis factor and its relationship among the factors that 
might be present at any given airport location (p. 33).  
 Kim and Yang (2012) took a different approach in identifying risk frequency of 
hazards related to runway incursions. They developed an analytical hierarchal process 
wherein 15 hazards were weighted in such a manner that the area with the highest score 
was more likely to become an area where runway incursions would happen in the future 
(Kim & Yang, 2012, p. 30). Kim and Yang (2012) established that hazards causing 
runway incursions varied depending upon the airport’s environment and operational 
characteristics (p. 31). The researchers further concluded that the largest contribution to 
runway incursion was a “misunderstanding of ATC’s instructions,” followed by a 
“momentary forgetting/confusion” of a clearance issued, misidentification of an 
aircraft/vehicle or its location, and loss of situational awareness (Kim & Yang, 2012, p. 
34). As such, training in these critical areas was essential in order to reduce the number of 
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runway incursions. If runway incursion locations could be effectively identified, then 
methods and technologies designed to reduce the chance of these runway incursions 
happening at these locations in the future was critical.  
 Schonefeld and Moller (2012) provided a methodology for developing and 
implementing technological responses designed to prevent runway incursions (p. 31). 
From a theoretical perspective, runway incursion prevention technology has been 
primarily premised on protective measures designed to inhibit those causes that 
oftentimes lead to runway incursions and additionally provide timely alerts which make 
pilots and others aware of a potential runway incursion. According to Schonefeld and 
Moller (2012), previous and current studies have uniformly agreed that positive 
situational awareness was a primary preventative key in avoiding runway incursions and 
safely mitigating them should they occur (p. 35). If proper technological advancements 
were made available and implemented by the airports, Jones and Young (2001) had 
previously estimated an 80% reduction in runway incursions would result by effectively 
enhancing the situational awareness of flight crews and air traffic controllers.  
 Schonefeld and Moller (2012) concluded that there were two basic approaches to 
preventing runway incursions - avoid entering an active runway and timely detecting an 
imminent runway incursion so that the situation could be effectively resolved (p. 35). The 
ability to timely prevent a runway incursion has been frequently dependent on the type of 
surveillance system that provides the information to the individual handling the runway 
incursion problem (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 35). Previous research has also 
supported that reliable, effective and accurate surveillance systems at airports, which 
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effectively monitor aircraft movement areas, has had a positive influence on the reduction 
of  runway incursions (Jones, Quach, & Young, 2001; Jones & Young, 2001; Singh & 
Meier, 2004: Squire, Barrow, Durkee, Smith, & Moore, 2010).  
Determining which surveillance system best suites a particular airport 
environment has been a relatively recent research topic. One type of surveillance system 
designed to reduce runway incursions has been the Runway Incursion Prevention and 
Alerting System (RIPAS). Stevens and Sanchez (2010) found that the integration of 
RIPAS into the workflow of an air traffic controller (ATC) oftentimes depends on the 
reliability of the surveillance technology. RIPAS is capable of immediately reacting to 
aircraft route deviations that could result in a runway incursion and then providing direct 
and timely situational information to both the flight crew and the air traffic controller in 
order to prevent a runway incursion (Squire et al., 2010).  
Theoretically, if RIPAS achieved its stated objective, then there should not only 
be a decrease in the number of runway incursions as well as the events leading to 
potential runway incursion, but also a corresponding decrease in the severity of the 
runway incursion should also occur (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 36). This theory was 
premised on the fact that aircraft traffic depends on a series of decisions by humans, 
which without adequate information can result in poor outcomes (Schonefeld & Moller, 
2012, p. 36). With the quality of information enhanced through effective technology, 
poor decisions can be effectively minimized (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012, p. 36). 
Schonefeld and Moller (2012) further asserted that any remaining poor decisions would 
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be identified by surveillance technology and a sound warming alert would occur, thereby 
further reducing the likelihood of a runway incursion (p. 36).  
Studies from NASA (2005), FAA (2009), and EUROCONTROL (2010) also 
concluded that technologies such as RIPAS and Runway Incursion Advisory and Alert 
System (RIAAS) have the potential to significantly decrease the number of runway 
incursions, thereby reducing the overall risk of an aviation accident (Jones & Prinzel, 
2011). NASA (2005) research, conducted jointly by NASA Langley Research Center and 
Rannoch Corporation, explored the potential safety advantages associated with the 
implementation of RIASS. Similar to RIPAS, RIAAS provides alerts to pilots through an 
aircraft-based alerting system (NASA, 2005, p. 1). The research was premised upon three 
component parts, including an Airborne Research Integrated Experimental System 
(ARIES), aircraft mission simulator and eight commercial airline crews (NASA, 2005, 
pp. 7-8). These tests were conducted under various meteorological conditions utilizing 
several cockpit technologies (NASA, 2005, p. 8) and also incorporated a pilot survey 
regarding their opinions about the Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS).  
The survey revealed that pilots unanimously felt that RIPS technology created a 
safer cockpit environment, while 75 percent believed the alerts they received through 
RIPS were timely and allowed them an adequate opportunity to effectively react to 
pending aviation conflicts (NASA, 2005, p. 8). Meanwhile, the studies’ flight tests 
established the reliability of the systems cross-runway alerting logic with only a small 
number of missed alerts generally resulting from traffic ADS-B data interface problems 
(NASA, 2005, p. 9). The research also utilized a simulator, which developed data through 
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a series of standard runway incursion scenarios with real-time traffic (NASA, 2005, p. 9). 
An analysis of the data established that RIAAS alerts provided adequate time for safe 
evasive maneuvers (NASA, 2005, p. 10). NASA (2005) concluded that the integration of 
RIAAS could reduce the risks associated with severe runway incursions (p. 13). It further 
determined that RIAAS would have significant influence at airports without automated 
aircraft ground movement surveillance systems (NASA, 2005, p. 13). Even at airports 
with ground surveillance systems, substantial benefits resulted from RIAAS alerts to 
pilots with a minimum number of false alerts when a conflict was not actually present 
(NASA, 2005, p. 13). In conclusion, NASA (2005) research established that the RIAAS 
aircraft alerting system was valid and effectively reduced runway incursions at airports, 
thereby increasing runway safety (p. 13).  
The FAA (2009) research focused on educating aviation stakeholders on 
multifaceted approaches for the reduction of runway incursions at the nation’s airports. 
As part of the study, more than 40 aviation leaders from various airports, airlines, pilot 
unions, air traffic controllers, and aerospace manufacturers worked collectively to 
identify those sections of the NAS which could be vulnerable to human error, thereby 
increasing the chance of a runway incursion (FAA, 2009, p. 2). The stakeholders worked 
collectively to improve cockpit and air traffic procedures, safety markings, airport 
signage as well as technology and training (FAA, 2009, p. 8).  
These stakeholders further addressed proposed FAA strategies for increased 
improvement in runway safety (FAA, 2009, p. 8). Additionally, they recommended that 
enhanced communications procedures be established between fellow cockpit 
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crewmembers as well as more effective coordination with and between air traffic 
controllers (FAA, 2009, p. 8). These stakeholders concluded that with more explicit taxi 
instructions between controllers and flight crews, the levels of situational awareness and 
control of aircraft movements on the airport will increase (FAA, 2009, p. 8). 
Recommendations were also encourage for updates in applicable standards for airport 
signage and markings (FAA, 2009, p. 8) as well as improved technological 
implementation such as RIAAS or RIPAS within the cockpit and control towers (p. 9).       
FAA (2009) emphasized the importance of timely implementation of runway 
safety-enhancing technologies at airports throughout the United States (p. 9). These 
technologies included Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), 
FAROS, and RWSL (FAA, 2009, p. 9).  
Runway Status Lights alerts pilots to potential runway incursions using a system 
of lights embedded into runway surfaces, which results in pilots obtaining enhanced 
situational awareness and providing increased assistance in avoiding potential aircraft 
accidents (FAA, 2009, pp. 22–23). The ASDE-X serves as a method of surface detection 
equipment technology that enables air traffic controllers to detect potential runway 
incursion conflicts before they occur (FAA, 2009). Additionally, the electronic flight bag 
and airport moving map display provide pilots with information regarding a variety of 
aviation topics and can improve situational awareness through increased surface safety. 
Finally, FAROS uses flashing lights visible to pilots on approaching aircrafts to warn 
them that the runway is occupied, thus preventing accidents and incursions on airport 
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runways (FAA, 2009). By the end of 2011, each of the airports analyzed in this 
dissertation had installed these technologies (GAO, 2013).  
   The impetus for EUROCONTROL (2010) was the significant number of runway 
incursions that could potentially result in an aircraft accident. The study expressed 
concerns that with increasing levels of air traffic throughout the world as well as an 
increased pressure on efficient operations during all phases of flight, a growing threat of 
aircraft incursions and accidents exists (EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 9). With increased 
concern regarding the whole airport environment, expanding the focus of airport surface 
safety nets to include taxiways and airport apron areas and the introduction of integrated 
surface safety net functions was important. Surface safety nets, which incorporate 
technologies, such as RIAAS and RIPAS, alert air traffic controllers, flight crews, or 
vehicle drivers to potentially hazardous situations in an effective manner with sufficient 
warning time for the situation to be resolved (EUROCONTROL, 2010). Surface safety 
nets rely on Airport Safety Roadmaps that build on operational requirements laid out by 
ICAO and are supported by an operational analysis of key hazardous situations 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 1).  
The Roadmap for Airport Surface Movement Safety Nets was designed to 
increase the coverage of hazardous situations for surface movements and provide direct 
alerts to flight crews and vehicle drivers (EUROCONTROL, 2010). The surface safety 
nets cover the complete airport movement areas, including taxiways and aprons, thereby 
improving safety warnings to allow for effective and timely resolutions of pending 
aircraft conflicts. EUROCONTROL (2010) found that surface safety nets enhance 
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situational awareness while reducing breakdowns in communications and potential air 
traffic controller errors.  
 As the research established, surface safety nets can effectively monitor the 
distance between aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface area (EUROCONTROL, 
2010). Generally, flying aircrafts have limited maneuverability in terms of sudden 
changes in speed and direction of flight, while maintaining significant freedom in 
initiating evasive action when necessary to avoid potential conflicts (EUROCONTROL, 
2010, p. 7). Comparatively, aircrafts on the ground are more flexible in terms of adjusting 
the direction and speed of their movement, but are limited to the airport’s available 
taxiways and runways. In this regard, EUROCONTROL (2010) concluded that visibility, 
airport layout, and available technological systems and procedures all play a significant 
role in maintaining safety.  
EUROCONTROL (2010) further concluded that even though surface safety nets 
are useful for enhancing safety, the safety function is not independently sufficient and 
further studies are needed to improve alerting performance within aircraft and control 
towers (p. 9). Enhanced communication between the safety net function and flight crews 
is an additional approach with significant potential for increasing airport safety 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010, p. 9).  
 EUROCONTROL (2010) found other potential benefits with the implementation 
of airport surface safety nets included a reduction in the risk of collisions between aircraft 
and between aircraft and vehicles. Surface safety nets could further reduce the potential 
damage caused to aircrafts involved in an aircraft, thereby reducing injuries and aircraft 
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damage (EUROCONTROL, 2010). Surface safety nets assist in increasing the efficiency 
of surface movements and mitigate the risks of operational disruptions. Additional 
positive outcomes include an increase in the time available to identify actions necessary 
to avoid a collision by instructing the effected flight crew or vehicle driver 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010). EUROCONTROL (2010) finally established that automation 
would effectively assist flight crews by improving their situational awareness and 
reducing the prospect of detected hazards or operational errors. The researchers 
acknowledged that future researchers of aircraft operational issues should consider pilot 
and flight crew input, which would provide increased data to further enhance airport 
safety (EUROCONTROL, 2010). 
 Schonefeld and Moller (2012) concluded that even with RIPAS installations, 
general aviation will still pose an unacceptable risk, affecting runway safety at many 
airports. As commercial aviation expands into airports used extensively by general 
aviation aircraft, the risk of runway incursions will likely increase. Although an open 
question exists regarding the eventual influence of RIPAS (Chapin, 2010), the experience 
from the deployment of RWSL and FAROS have established that direct visual clues at 
airports significantly improve an airport’s overall runway safety (FAA, 2009).  
 Schonefeld and Moller (2012) asserted that pilots should have the ability to 
effectively avoid an inadvertent entry onto an active runway resulting in a runway 
incursion. Jones and Young (2001) previously identified three significant factors 
necessary for flight crews to avoid situations that could result in runway incursions. 
These factors included pilots’ constant awareness of the location of their aircraft at an 
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airport, an accurate understanding of the route that the aircraft was directed to travel by 
ATC, and the ability to effectively detect and correct route deviations (Jones & Young, 
2001). An accurate awareness of runway activity was also an influential factor in 
avoidance of runway incursions (ICAO, 2007; Singh & Meier, 2004).  
 Consistent with Jones and Young (2001), Schonefeld and Moller (2012) identified 
three factors that enhanced a pilot’s ability to timely detect a potential runway incursion. 
These factors include an awareness of other traffic in the airport environment, a 
continuing awareness of the aircraft’s location in the airport environment, and the activity 
status of the operating runway (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). If these factors are present, 
the likelihood of a runway incursion decreases significantly (Schonefeld & Moller, 
2012).  
 Surveillance sensors on an airport can also provide relevant and timely 
information to both the controller and pilot regarding the aircraft’s location and its 
current operating environment (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). During a series of runway 
incursion prevention system tests in 2000, the failure of a surveillance system to alert 
pilots in time to avoid a runway incursion were most often caused by unreliability of the 
Automatic Dependency Surveillance-Broadcast and Traffic Information Broadcast traffic 
data (Cassell, 2005; Cassell, Evers, Sleep, & Esche, 2001; Green, 2002; Jones & Young, 
2001). These inherent problems were predominantly corrected with the development of 
RIPAS (Jones & Prinzel, 2011). 
 Garibay and Young (2013) analyzed airline operational strategies in an effort to 
reduce general aviation accidents. Because the United States hosts the largest and most 
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diverse general aviation community in the world, these strategies could prove beneficial 
in reducing the large number of runway incursions happening in the general aviation 
community (Doquette & Dorr, 2012; General Aviation Manufactures Association, 2010). 
Compared to general aviation pilots, commercial pilots undergo more frequent training 
and are required to complete mandated proficiency checks prior to providing services for 
commercial operators, with most major airline carriers exceeding the minimum currency 
and training requirements (ALPA, 2011).  
 Historically, general aviation accident rates have been more frequent than those of 
the commercial airlines, as commercial flying has been one of the safest modes of 
transportation, a recognition not shared with general aviation (Abu-Taieh, El Sheikh, & 
Jafari, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012). Shetty and Hansman (2012) asserted that one 
possible explanation for this disparity was the difference in operational style between 
general aviation and commercial airlines. Garibay and Young (2013) contended that it 
might be possible to improve general aviation safety through the adoption of the best 
practices utilized by the commercial airlines. This higher level of safety can be explained 
by the fact that both airline pilots and dispatchers were held jointly responsibility for the 
safety of every flight (see Aeronautics and Space, 1962; Krause & Jansen, 2014), and 
were also better organized and had many more resources than general aviation. Because 
general aviation is composed of a wide range of operations, such as crop-dusting, banner 
towing, and personal flying (Air Safety Institute, 2010; General Aviation Manufactures 
Association, 2010), focusing on improving safety protocols in general aviation by 
determining how general aviation can use airline operational strategies could potentially 
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be helpful in reducing runway incursions and improving aviation safety (Garibay & 
Young, 2013, p. 2).  
 Because flight plan quality and flexibility, available resources, as well as 
governmental regulations are the primary differences between general aviation and 
commercial operations (Garibay & Young, 2013), general aviation should take specific 
actions. These actions include (a) embracing in-cockpit technology, which would 
encourage safer operations and also permit reliable data collection regarding general 
aviation trends for data-driven decision making; (b) offering incentives for pilots to 
undergo quality recurrent and safety training, while also eliminating loopholes or 
shortcuts that compromise safety; and (c) implementing a system of checks and balances 
to ensure that pilots have a sufficient safety net from human error (Garibay & Young, 
2013, p. 15). Garibay and Young (2013) asserted that by incorporating these basic actions 
into general aviation’s flight operations, general aviation’s safety record could be 
improved.   
 As research continues on the development of aviation safety strategies designed to 
reduce runway incursions, one of the most promising programs that could improve 
aviation safety is the FAA’s concept of flight operations for the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, commonly referred to as NextGen (FAA, 2011a). NextGen is the 
transition from the current ground-based navigation system to a satellite-based one that 
relies on the use of a combination of technologies (GAO, 2012b). One of these new 
technologies would notify pilots at all times of the precise location of other airplanes 
around them, thereby increasing situational awareness and enhancing safety (McHale, 
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2010). This enhanced situational awareness would likely be helpful in reducing the 
number of runway incursions throughout the United States.  
 Aviation safety literature has pertained to the cause, the potential outcomes of 
runway incursions, and ways in which runway incursions could be reduced or avoided 
through new aviation procedures as well as the installation of new safety technology. 
Government agencies, both foreign and domestic, various aviation stakeholders, and 
aviation safety researchers have primarily produced aviation literature. Numerous 
methods to identify probable causes of runway incursions and ways to prevent them have 
resulted in the development of a number of procedural and technological advancements 
designed to eliminate or reduce runway incursions at the nation’s airports. Continuing 
research in the areas of runway incursions throughout the world will be helpful in better 
identifying the causes of runway incursions as well as developing and implementing 
procedures that are more advanced and technologies that will be beneficial in reducing 
runway incursions. The research developed from this quantitative dissertation provides 
needed information to further enhance the FAA’s RSP and thereby more effectively 
reduce runway incursions.  
Program Evaluation Methods  
 Significant in evaluating any government program is the selected program 
evaluation method (Mertens & Wilson, 2012). Evaluation analyzes a program and its 
objectives, asks whether these objectives have been achieved, and further identifies the 
value of continuing the current program or developing a new, more useful one that will 
better achieve the intended objective of the project (Rossi & Freeman, 1993). Identifying 
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the components of an effective evaluation as well as the potential methods through which 
it can best be accomplished provides the relevant context that supports the evaluation 
methodology utilized in this dissertation.  
 Experts have agreed that an evaluation should not only assess program results, but 
also identify ways in which to improve the evaluated program (Wholey, Hatry, & 
Newcomer, 2010). Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2009) identified different levels of 
evaluation and how these levels could integrate evaluation data and thereby provide 
beneficial results to those who might rely on the results. Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick 
(2009) identified four levels of evaluation as (a) Level 1: Reaction, or participant 
impressions; (b) Level 2: Learning, or learning acquired; (c) Level 3: Behavior, or the 
application of the learning; and (d) Level 4: Results, or the extent that targeted outcomes 
occur for the company agency or school system. Utilizing these levels in program 
analysis would assist in properly analyzing the effect of a program. At the end of a 
program cycle, the evaluation findings should then be used to determine whether to alter 
or maintain the program operations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The results from this 
research study provide relevant data that supports the continuance of the FAA RSP but 
suggest areas in which it could be improved. 
 Different types of program evaluations entail different outcomes. Evaluations 
focused on examining and changing processes as they occur are called formative 
evaluations, whereas evaluations focused on reporting what occurred at the end of the 
program cycle are called summative evaluations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 16).  
Contrary to a formative evaluation, which involves examining a program in progress, a 
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summative evaluation is an assessment of the program’s overall effectiveness (Boulmetis 
& Dutwin, 2011, p. 60). Researchers need to select the appropriate program evaluation 
method to obtain the desired and relevant information from a program analysis.  
 The program evaluation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP is a summative evaluation 
designed to obtain information regarding the impact of the RSP to effectively reduce 
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Since the effectiveness of the RSP 
is at issue in this dissertation, I reviewed the FAARSP’s effectiveness within the context 
of a summative evaluation. Since each of the five busiest airports in the nation had the 
latest technological advancements in place during the pendency of 2009–2011 RSP 
(GAO, 2008b), these airports served as a bellwether for the effectiveness of the FAA’s 
overall RSP. Understanding the relationship between the types, severity, and phase of 
flight of runway incursions before and after the FAA RSP is helpful in determining if the 
RSP effectively reduced runway incursions.  
 When conducting an effective evaluation, a researcher needs to understand both 
the political and social climate that exists within the government program (Boulmetis & 
Dutwin, 2011). Several different ways exist through which a program can be structured, 
including the transactional approach (Rippey, 1973), the goal-free approach (Scriven, 
1991), as well as the goal-based evaluation approach (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Other 
models that researchers have developed to assist with evaluations include the systems 
analysis model developed by Rivlin (1971), the art criticism model developed by Eisner 




 Rippey (1973) identified the transaction model, which focuses on activity 
occurring between the evaluator, the participant, and significant project staff. The 
beneficiaries of this method of evaluation are the clients and practitioners (Boulmetis & 
Dutwin, 2011, p. 106). This model integrates process evaluation with effective 
monitoring through a continuous interchange of information between the evaluator and 
staff, in which the evaluator is an active participant who provides feedback throughout 
the process (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The transaction goal-based model meanwhile 
involves the use of subjectivity, as opposed to objectivity, in its analysis of a program 
(Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).  
 Scriven (1991) developed the goal-free evaluation model to evaluate a program’s 
actual effect on the needs identified. This evaluation method entails examining the steps a 
program has taken to address the particularized needs of the client population (Boulmetis 
& Dutwin, 2011, p. 104). Though the goal-free model is difficult to use for conducting 
evaluations when the evaluator is part of the program, it is a popular method because a 
researcher can effectively utilize it in a program with many simultaneously occurring 
projects (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). After the collection of the data, conclusions are 
drawn by the evaluator regarding the effect of the program on satisfying the needs of the 
client (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). When the evaluator is looking at actual effects rather 
than anticipated effects for which quantitative tools have been designed, the goal-free 
model is preferable, especially in qualitative evaluations (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). 
 Alternatively, Provus’ (1971) discrepancy evaluation model can be effectively 
used in situations in which an understanding exists that the program does not work 
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independently but instead is part of a complex organizational structure. When the focus is 
not to establish a cause-and-effect relationship but instead to only adequately understand 
the evidence to make reasonable assumptions about cause and effect relationships, this 
model is most effective (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 102). This model assists in the 
decision-making process when decisions are based on the difference between present 
standards and what actually exists (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). The strength of this 
model lies in the staff being involvement in determining and using the evaluation criteria 
and standards, which is helpful to program staff who have an evaluator working with 
them from the beginning of program (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).  
 Researchers frequently use Madaus, Scriven, and Stufflebeam (1993) decision-
making model as a tool to make decisions regarding the future use of a program. With the 
decision-making model, increased concern exists regarding a program’s long-term effects 
and less with how the program is currently performing (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 
107). As such, the decision making model focuses on decisions that will need to be made 
in the future. The actual methodology used to collect data can vary significantly with 
both quantitative methods, such as tests and records, and qualitative methods, such as 
interviews, observations, and surveys utilized for data collection depending on what the 
sponsor desires to know to make a decision (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Though 
researchers can use the decision-making model to structure formative evaluations, they 




 Meanwhile, the systems analysis model pertains to a program using a systemic 
method to studying the input, throughput, and output of a program (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 
2011, p. 108). This evaluation model is frequently utilized to analyze whether a program 
is getting individuals through a particular program in an efficient manner, as well as 
whether the program is achieving its goals (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). Alternatively, 
with the art criticism model, the evaluator, who is a qualified expert in all aspects of the 
program, becomes an expert judge on the program’s operation (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 
2011, p. 108). The evaluator’s ability to judge objectively determines the effectiveness of 
the model. Generally, this evaluation model is employed when a critical review of a 
program is necessary prior its application for funding or accreditation (Boulmetis & 
Dutwin, 2011).  
 Another program evaluation method is the adversary evaluation model, in which 
the evaluator establishes a jury who will evaluate evidence developed from individuals on 
particular program aspects (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 109). The jury then judges the 
evidence using applicable criteria to determine what is actually occurring in the program 
(Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011). When differing views exist between clients, staff, 
community members, or sponsors of what is occurring in a program, this model can 
effectively resolve the differences (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011).  
 Scriven (1991) described a goal-based evaluation as “any type of evaluation based 
on and knowledge of—and reference to—the goals and objectives of the program, 
person, or product” (p. 178). This method, also known as the objective attainment 
method, is frequently used because of its ease in conducting the program evaluations. 
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Usually based on stated objectives or goals identified in a proposal, brochure, or other 
program description, this goal-based evaluation method is not concerned with ancillary 
items, variables, or occurrences that might be spin-off products of the program activities 
as opposed to the specifically stated objectives (Boulmetis & Dutwin, 2011, p. 109). In 
this method, the evaluator seeks to measure specific outcome variables using quantitative 
or qualitative methods.  
 Similar to the goal-based model, researchers can effectively utilize the impact-
based evaluation model to determine whether a particular program has achieved its 
desired impact. With most impact evaluations, the researcher seeks to isolate the effects 
of a particular program to provide decision makers with the ability to determine whether 
a program should be continued, expanded, or modified (Henry, 2010, p. 125). This model 
relies on comparative data from before and after the program to determine the program’s 
influence on achieving its stated objectives (Henry, 2010). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and Holland (1986) established the theoretical base for using a comparative group design 
when analyzing the effect of policy and programs. Researchers have utilized impact 
evaluations using quantitative estimates between comparative groups when establishing 
the causal effects of programs (Henry, 2010). More specifically, using an interrupted 
time-series design is appropriate for longitudinal studies where data exists for before and 
after the implementation of the program (Henry, 2010).  
 When evaluating the effect of government-based programs, researchers of 
comparison group studies have regularly utilized an interrupted time-series design 
(Biglan, Ary, & Wagenaar, 2000; Bloom, 2003; Bloom & Riccio, 2005; Dee & Jacobs, 
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2011; Henry & Gordon, 2003; Penfold & Zhang, 2013). Henry and Gordon (2003) 
utilized an interrupted time-series design when evaluating the effect of a public 
information campaign designed to reduce air pollution. Biglan, Ary, and Wagenaar 
(2000) advocated the use of comparison group interrupted time-series experiments when 
conducting community intervention research. Penfold and Zhang (2013) asserted that the 
interrupted time-series design worked effectively as a tool for evaluating quality 
improvement (impact) of a program, especially health care quality improvements. Bloom 
(2003) provided guidance regarding the effective use of a comparison group interrupted 
time-series design when measuring the influence of school reform. Dee and Jacob (2011) 
used a comparison group interrupted time-series design to effectively measure the effect 
of No Child Left Behind legislation on student achievement. Finally, Bloom and Riccio 
(2005) utilized a comparison group interrupted time-series analysis to evaluate the effect 
of an employment program for public housing residents. Using a comparison group 
interrupted time-series design to evaluate the effect of the FAA RSP is beneficial when 
seeking to determine the program’s impact on the reduction of runway incursions.   
 In using an impact-based interrupted time-series design, I sought to determine 
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s 
five busiest airports. The goal of the FAA RSP was to reduce the number of runway 
incursions at the nation’s airports (FAA, 2008). It accomplished this objective by 
measuring the specific outcome variables of the RSP. Specifically, it analyzed the types, 
severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions both before and after the FAA RSP. 
Understanding the relationship between these variables before and after the RSP is 
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important in assisting decision makers in determining whether the RSP should be 
modified in future years.  
 Though a variety of program evaluation methods exist, many evaluators will 
conduct their evaluations without strictly following any particular model of evaluation 
and rely on their personally developed evaluation philosophy, plans, and procedures 
(Worthen, 1990). Ultimately, the value of an evaluation model is premised on its ability 
to assist evaluators in providing sources of new ideas and techniques, which serves as 
mental checklists of those things that the evaluator should considered, remember, or be 
concerned about (Worthen, 1990, p. 46). A model’s value as prescriptive guidelines for 
doing evaluation studies is less significant (Worthen, 1990). 
Chapter Summary 
 Chapter 2 presented the relevant literature available on aviation safety, runway 
incursions, and government program evaluation literature. Governmental organizations 
both in the United States and from around the world produced the majority of the aviation 
safety literature. In the worldwide literature, researchers have universally recognized the 
global threat posed by runway incursions to aviation safety as a significant problem 
requiring immediate effective solutions. Struggling with the most effective and efficient 
ways to solve this problem has been an ongoing debate identified throughout the 
literature. In the aviation safety literature, researchers consistently described the threats 
associated with runway incursions but have not identified the best way to predict runway 
incursions or how best to prevent or reduce their potential risk in the first place. In much 
of the government, stakeholder, and academic research literature, researchers sought to 
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more fully explain the critical factors associated with runway incursions and identify the 
best methods through which runway incursions could be effectively reduced through the 
use of technology, alternative air traffic control procedures and training.  
 Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this research study, which is premised on 
the literature review in Chapter 2. I describe the study methodology in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 also expands the description of the research design and the methods of analysis 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 When evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest 
U.S. airports, a summative, impact-based evaluation to analyze runway incursions that 
happened before and after the implementation of the RSP was appropriate. A summative 
evaluation entails a focus on the effects or outcomes of a particular project (Rossi, 
Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). According to Trochim (2006), a summative evaluation can be 
divided into several different categories, including outcome evaluations, impact 
evaluations, cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, secondary analysis, and meta-
analysis. Using an impact-based evaluation, the researcher seeks to determine the effect a 
program had in achieving its stated goals and objectives (Henry, 2010).  
 In this study, a summative, impact-based evaluation was the most appropriate 
method to evaluate the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP because I considered 
the relationship between the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions 
that have occurred before and after the implementation of the RSP. Specifically, I sought 
to determine whether the same types, severity, and phases of flight runway incursions 
continue to occur after the completion of the 2009–2011 RSP. If so, then the RSP has not 
reduced the runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports and has failed to 
achieve the RSP stated goals and objectives. Alternatively, if positive change occurred in 
the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest 
airports after the 2009–2011 RSP, then the program effectively reduced runway 
incursions at these airports. The conclusions drawn from this study determine whether the 
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FAA 2009–2011 RSP achieved its targeted impact of reducing runway incursions at the 
nation’s five busiest airports. If not, decision makers should consider a re-evaluation of 
the RSP and the consideration of alternative safety methods designed to reduce runway 
incursions. 
 The outcome of this impact-based evaluation has a significant determination 
regarding whether the FAA RSP should continue in its current form. If the RSP has been 
effective, then further improvements and additional federal funding could be beneficial in 
further reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. Alternatively, if 
the RSP has been ineffective at positively changing the types, severity, and phases of 
flight of runway incursions, then future researchers need to explore alternative safety 
methods designed to achieve a reduction in runway incursions. The FAA must take the 
steps necessary to ensure that safety in the NAS is properly maintained (FAA, 2010). 
This study provided information that could be instrumental in the development of future 
runway safety programs. 
 When assessing the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP, a process that 
compares the runway incursions before and after the program’s implementation was 
necessary. A comparison group, interrupted time-series design was appropriate for this 
longitudinal study as data exists that I used to compare the effect of the RSP before and 
after the implementation of the RSP (Henry, 2010, p. 135). Comparative group design 
studies are appropriate when analyzing the effect of policy and programs (Holland, 1986; 
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Researchers have used impact evaluations when analyzing 
quantitative estimates between comparative groups to identify the causal effects of a 
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program on variables (Henry, 2010). The FAA data that describes the types, severity, and 
phases of flight for runway incursions occurring before and after the implementation of 
the RSP were used for this quantitative analysis, thereby allowing me to assess the effect 
of the RSP and establishing its effectiveness for reducing runway incursions.  
 I analyzed all runway incursions occurring at the five busiest U.S. airports for a 
period of 3 years before the implementation of the program (October 1, 2005 through 
September 30, 2008) and the 3-year period after the implementation of the program 
(October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2014). The 3 years during the pendency of the 
program were excluded from the analysis. Because I focused on the five busiest U.S. 
airports based upon total passenger boardings and aircraft movements, I analyzed FAA 
data applicable to these events.  
Research Design and Approach 
 To assess the effectiveness of the FAA’s 2009–2011 RSP, a process that 
compares the runway incursions before and after the RSP’s implementation was 
necessary. To complete this assessment, a comparative group, interrupted time-series 
design was used to compare data from before and after the completion of the RSP. A 
comparative group, interrupted time-series design is most appropriate when evaluators 
wish to assess the effect of programs on their intended outcomes (Henry, 2010; Holland, 
1986; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Comparison group designs represent alternatives to 
randomized experiments when the goal of the evaluation is to provide a quantitative 
estimate of the causal effects of a program (Henry, 2010, p. 125). The comparative 
groups for this study were the runway incursions occurring 3 years before the 
78 
 
implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP and those occurring 3 years after the completion 
of the program. The purpose of most impact evaluations is to isolate the effects of a 
program to help decision makers decide whether the program should be continued, 
improved, or expanded (Henry, 2010, p. 125).   
 I used a comparison group, interrupted time-series design to assess the effect of 
the FAA 2009–2011 RSP on their goal of reducing runway incursions in regard to the 
type, severity, and phase of flight of each of the runway incursions. In this study, I 
conducted a comparison using descriptive statistics of runway incursions occurring 
before and after the implementation of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. Descriptive statistics 
are generally used to numerically describe a group of people, events, work, or other 
concepts (NcNabb, 2008). A comparison group design provides an alternative to 
randomized experiments when the goal of the evaluation is to provide a quantitative 
estimate of the causal effects of a program (Wholey et al., 2010). In this evaluation, the 
intended outcome was to determine whether the FAA RSP was able to positively change 
the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions.  
Publically available FAA data on all runway incursions throughout the United 
States occurring between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2014 was procured directly 
from the FAA. These data were available and provided by the FAA in an Excel format. 
The information on each runway incursions includes date and time of occurrence, 
location (by airport), weather conditions, type of incursion, severity of incursion, aircraft 
type and category, phase of flight, and narrative description information of each runway 
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incursion. The FAA is the federal government agency charged with identifying, 
evaluating, and reporting runway incursions occurring in the United States (FAA, 2010).  
 The FAA has identified and described their source of data in the compilation of 
runway incursions occurring in the United States. The primary source of runway 
incursion reports has come from air traffic controllers and pilots (FAA Performance 
Measure Profile [FPMP], 2013). The data from these runway incursions are recorded in 
the Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis Reporting system. Preliminary incident 
reports are evaluated when received, and evaluations can take up to 90 days to complete 
(FPMP, 2013). Operations data used to calculate runway incursion rates were provided 
by OPSNET, which I downloaded directly from the FAA operations and performance 
data database (FPMP, 2013).   
 The FAA has addressed the issue of completeness of its runway incursion data. 
The FAA stated that  
The data are typically not finalized for 90 days following the close of the fiscal 
year. Surface event reports are reviewed on a daily basis to determine if the 
incident meets the definition of a runway incursion. Runway incursions are a 
subset of the incident data collected and the completeness of the data is based on 
the reporting requirements and completeness for each of the incident types. 
(FPMP, 2013, p. 2)  
The FAA and other agencies have generally used annual runway incursion incident data 
to provide a statistical basis for research, analysis, and outreach initiatives (FPMP, 2013).  
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Setting and Sample 
 The FAA RSP is a national program implemented to reduce runway incursions 
throughout the United States. Through this study, I focused on runway incursions at the 
five busiest U.S. airports. All runway incursion data from these five airports for the 
relevant period of time were analyzed as a part of this study. The five busiest U.S. 
airports were identified based on total passenger boardings and total aircraft movements 
for the fiscal year (FAA, 2014c). A passenger boarding occurs when a passenger gets 
onto an aircraft and departs from that airport (FAA, 1999). An aircraft movement occurs 
each time an aircraft either lands or takes off from an airport (FAA, 1999). The five 
busiest airports in relationship to passenger boardings and aircraft movements for 
calendar years 2011 through 2013 were ATL, ORD, LAX, DFW, and DEN. The 
passenger boardings and aircraft movements at the five busiest airports represent a 
significant portion of all passenger boardings and aircraft movements that occur annually 
in the United States (FAA, 2014c). The implications of runway incursions and FAA 
efforts to effectively reduce them at these five airports are critical for the overall safety of 
the NAS.  
Addressing Bias 
 In all research, the potential exists that biases can negatively affect the study’s 
results. As such, researchers should engage in the objective collection of data and seek a 
fair and impartial interpretation of the results by participating in “reflexivity, which 
means that the research actively engages in critical self-reflection about his or her 
potential biases and predispositions” (Johnson, 1997, p. 284). I sought to determine 
81 
 
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest 
airports. This quantitative study served to answer this question via analysis of the 
relationship between the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions before 
and after the implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP at the five busiest U.S. airports.  
 I used the quantitative data to analyze the relationship between the variables in 
this study, collected by the FAA. In their collection process, the FAA took steps to ensure 
the reliability and completeness of their runway incursion data (FPMP, 2013). McNabb 
(2004) defined archival data research as a way of reviewing published or previously 
prepared data. Consistent with archival data research, all relevant FAA datasets in this 
study were already derived, published, and reported in official government records 
(McNabb, 2004). As such, the risk associated with biased data collection negatively 
affecting the outcome of the study was less significant than in other types of research 
(McNabb, 2004).  
 Maintaining independence in data collection and processing is important. Yin 
(2008) suggested that the ability of a researcher to remain open to contrary findings can 
reduce the possibility of the inadvertent introduction of substantial bias into a study (p. 
72). In this study, I planned to avoid the introduction of bias by keeping an open mind 
regarding any potential outcomes, thereby reducing the potential for biases to negatively 
affect the results of this study. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 I entered the FAA runway incursion data into SPSS version 22.0 for Windows. 
These FAA data were collected from runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005 
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through September 30, 2014. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was granted 
prior to the start of any research related to data collection. IRB provided the following 
approval number: 06-24-16-0055329. The runway incursion data generated during the 
pendency of the 2009–2011 RSP (10/01/2008 through 09/30/2011) were excluded from 
the dataset. Thus, I only assessed data from 3 years before and 3 years after the 2009–
2011 RSP. Only FAA data from the following airports were examined: ATL, ORD, 
LAX, DFW, and DEN. I conducted descriptive statistics to describe the sample 
demographics and the research variables used in the analysis. Frequencies and 
percentages were calculated for nominal data, and means and standard deviations were 
calculated for continuous data (Howell, 2013).  
 I screened the runway incursion data for accuracy, missing data, and outliers. The 
presence of outliers was tested by examination of standardized values. Standardized 
values represent the number of standard deviations the value is from the mean. Values 
higher than 3.29 are considered to be outliers and should be removed from the dataset 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Runway incursions with missing data were examined for 
nonrandom patterns. The study did not include data entries in which a lack of complete 
major sections existed. 
Research Question 1 
 Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on the 
runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
 Ho1: There is a no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur 
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
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 Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on 
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 To examine Research Question 1, I conducted a 2x5 chi-square analysis to assess 
if differences existed between the types of runway incursions that occurred before and 
after the RSP was implemented. A chi-square analysis is the appropriate analysis to 
conduct when the goal is to assess the relationship between two nominal variables 
(Pallant, 2010). In this case, time (pre vs. post) was the nominal independent variable of 
the analysis. The dependent variable was the type of runway incursion, with levels of 
operational deviation, operational error, pilot deviation, and vehicle or pedestrian 
deviation. 
Research Question 2 
 Is there a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that occurred 
before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
 Ho2: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 To examine Research Question 2, I conducted a Mann-Whitney U test to assess if 
differences existed between the severity of incidents that occurred before and after the 
FAA implemented the 2009–2011 RSP. A Mann-Whitney U test is the appropriate 
analysis to be conducted when the goal is to assess if differences exist in an ordinal 
dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case, 
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time (pre vs. post) was the nominal independent variable of the analysis. The dependent 
variable was the severity of the runway incursion, with levels of Cat. A, Cat. B, Cat. C, 
and Cat. D; Cat. A as the most severe and Cat. D was the least severe.  
Research Question 3 
 Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway incursion 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
 Ho3: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.  
 Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 To examine Research Question 3, I conducted a 2x3 chi-square analysis to assess 
if differences existed between the phases of flight for the runway incursion that occurred 
before and after the FAA implemented the 2009–2011 RSP. A chi-square analysis is the 
appropriate analysis to conduct when the goal is to assess the relationship between two 
nominal variables (Pallant, 2010). In this case, time (pre vs. post) was the nominal 
independent variable of the analysis. The dependent variable was phase of flight for the 
runway incursion, with levels of taxiing (TX), take-off (T/O) and landing (LNDG).   
Sample Sizes 
 I conducted a sample size power analysis in G*Power. Examination of the results 
of the 2x5 chi-square, Mann-Whitney U test, and the 2x3 chi-square followed. Using a 
medium effect size of .30, an alpha level of .05, and a power of .80, the researcher 
gathered at least 122 runway incursions to have an appropriate sample size to find 
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significance for a chi-square with four degrees of freedom. The Mann-Whitney U test 
required 184 runway incursions to find significance. The 2x3 chi-square only required 88 
runway incursions. Therefore, I aimed to include 92 runway incursions in each group, 
before and after the 2009–2011 RSP was implemented. This ensured that significance 
was achieved for all three tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Buckner, & Lang, 2013).  
Instrumentation and Materials 
 The runway incursion data utilized in this study came directly from the FAA. I 
analyzed the data through an appropriate quantitative analysis utilizing SPSS 22. The 
study did not include any other specific instrumentation or materials.  
Validity and Reliability 
 Validity and reliability are important concepts when conducting effective 
research. In this study, the researcher used FAA archival runway incursion data to 
compare the types, severity, and phases of flight of runway incursions before and after 
the implementation of the 2009–2011 RSP at the nation’s five busiest airports. According 
to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), validity concerns the question of whether 
the researcher is measuring what he or she intended to measure (p. 149). The data 
analyzed in this study came directly from archival data collected directly by the FAA 
during the course of their operations (FPMP, 2013). I did not create or utilize instruments 
to measure or collect data, but instead relied on the observational data from a federal 
government agency. As such, issues of validity in this study were not significant.  
  The FAA has addressed the issue of reliability of its runway incursion data. 
Reliability concerns whether the researcher included variable errors within the measuring 
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instrument (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). As part of the RSP, the FAA 
utilizes performance data and information collected through a defined, repeatable risk 
analysis for program management, personnel evaluation, and accountability in 
prioritizing the FAA facility audits and assessments (FPMP, 2013, p. 2). The FAA 
verifies and validates the accuracy of its runway incursion data through the initial 
validation process followed by quality assurance and quality control reviews. The FAA 
conducts reconciliation of the runway incursion database monthly and explores and 
resolves any anomalies (FPMP, 2013). If inconsistencies or other problems are identified, 
the FAA issues a request to re-submit the particular data (FPMP, 2013). Additionally, the 
FAA conducts annual reviews of reported runway incursion data, which is then compared 
with data reported from previous years. In this study, the data used in this analysis came 
directly from the FAA and was not assumed to suffer from measurement error, other than 
the potential for missing data or unreported cases. As such, the data used in this study 
was presumably reliable.  
Dissemination of Findings 
 I plan on sharing the findings of this study with the FAA, foreign governments, 
and other aviation stakeholders who share the goal of effectively reducing runway 
incursions. In developing the RSP, the FAA considered the interests of many 
stakeholders (FAA, 2008). Stakeholders have a direct interest in the success of the FAA 
RSP, which reduces runway incursions and thereby increases the overall safety of the 
NAS. These stakeholders also have an interest in the outcome of this study, as the results 
serve to affect future runway safety programs.  
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 I also plan on sharing the findings from this study with other federal government 
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, OIG, GAO, NTSB, with an interest 
in improving aviation safety. The findings will be shared with private organizations that 
have an interest in the reduction of runway incursions. These organizations include 
aviation stakeholders, such as Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the Experimental 
Aircraft Association, Air Lines Pilots Association, and National Business Aviation 
Association.  
 The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Experimental Aircraft 
Association strongly advocate on behalf of general aviation and the pilots who operate 
primarily general aviation aircraft and work cooperatively with the FAA to ensure the 
highest levels of safety in all air traffic operations. These organizational stakeholders 
specifically wish to protect the interests of their pilot members and ensure that the RSP 
does not impose too many restrictions, which could have a chilling effect on general 
aviation within the United States. The results of this study may encourage stakeholders to 
invest in future studies that may help in further reducing runway incursions, not only at 
the five busiest U.S. airports, but also at smaller general aviation airports located 
throughout the nation.  
 The results of this study will also be shared with the major airlines operating at 
the five busiest airports as well as the airports themselves. The major airlines are 
interested in ensuring that their share of the costs necessary to support and comply with 
the provisions of the RSP are not excessive, which would create an additional financial 
burden during economically challenging times. All of these stakeholders have the ability 
88 
 
to modify their policies, practices, and procedures in a manner that will more effectively 
reduce the potential for runway incursions. Therefore, it is reasonable that these 
stakeholders will also be interested in the outcome of the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the 2009–2011 RSP.  
 The results of this study are also appropriate for use by the airports identified in 
this study as well as the local airport unions that advocate for the many employees who 
perform duties on the airport properties and who could potentially cause a runway 
incursion. The airports, and the cities that in part fund them, should be concerned 
regarding the costs associated with reducing runway incursions. The physical 
modifications or technological improvements necessary to increase aviation safety while 
minimizing costs are an important consideration when working to effectively and 
efficiency reduce runway incursions at particular airports.  
 Employees who perform on or around the airport runways also share a substantial 
interest in the results of this study. These employees are constantly transferring baggage, 
cargo, supplies, and other items on and around the airport grounds and in the performance 
of their duties, must at times cross active runways. Finding ways to reduce runway 
incursions for this group would have a positive outcome, thus increasing their safety and 
the safety of the flying public. These employees should also be concerned that because of 
mandatory requirements of the FAA RSP, their activities and procedures on the airport 
grounds could be substantially curtailed. Because this group of stakeholders is 
predominantly interested in accomplishing their assigned duties with the least amount of 
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unnecessary interference, they too should be interested in learning about the results of 
this study.  
  Finally, another collective stakeholder with an interest in the success of the FAA 
RSP is the flying public. Though a nebulous group, the entire FAA safety program is 
designed to ultimately protect the flying public (FAA, 2010). An overly burdensome 
program that increases travel times or adds additional governmental fees per trip could 
have a significant, negative effect on air travel and its costs in the United States. 
Therefore, this collective stakeholders’ input should also be considered when evaluating 
the potential uses of this particular study. The flying public has a direct interest on the 
effectiveness of the FAA’s runway safety program.  
 Each of these stakeholders is involved to some degree in the FAA RSP and will 
be influenced by its success or failure; as such, their input should be given serious 
consideration when evaluating the results of this study within the context of future 
program modifications. Each stakeholder shares a direct interest in the results of the study 
because the outcome could help determine whether the FAA RSP remains in its current 
form or is modified to achieve a better effect. These stakeholders have worked side-by-
side with the FAA in a collaborative effort to promote the goal of aviation safety and in 
particular the reduction in the number of runway incursions occurring at airports in the 
United States and around the world.  
Chapter Summary 
 In Chapter 3, I explained the methodology for this quantitative research study. 
The methodology involved a summative impact-based evaluation using a comparison 
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group interrupted time-series design of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP to determine the 
effectiveness of the RSP at the five busiest U.S. airports. This chapter included a 
discussion of the selected research design and approach used to answer the research 
questions. I also addressed the source of the data used in the analysis, its acquisition 
method, and the setting and sample sized utilized in this study. Finally, the chapter 
included a presentation of the statistical methods and procedures implemented as part of 
the study as well as the dissemination of findings. In Chapter 4, I address the findings and 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze the type, severity, and 
phase of flight of runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports before and after the 
2009-2011 RSP, with the goal of providing information to reduce such occurrences and 
thereby increase aviation safety within the NAS. In this chapter, I address the following 
research questions and hypotheses:  
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on 
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
H01: There is a no relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur 
on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
Ha1: There is a relationship between the types of runway incursions that occur on 
the runway before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
H02: There is no relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
Ha2: There is a relationship between the severity of the runway incursions that 
occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
RQ3: Is there a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? 
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 H03: There is no relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP.  
 Ha3: There is a relationship between the phase of flight when the runway 
incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
 This chapter begins with a description of the data collection process, the 
preanalysis data cleaning, as well as descriptive statistics followed by a summary of the 
results. Following this is a detailed analysis of the results and a brief chapter summary.  
Data Collection 
 I collected the FAA data from runway incursions occurring from October 1, 2005 
through September 30, 2014. The dataset did not include runway incursion data generated 
during the pendency of the 2009–2011 RSP (10/01/2008 through 09/30/2011). Thus, the 
data collection only involved data from 3 years before (10/01/2005 through 09/30/2008) 
and 3 years after (10/01/2011 through 09/30/2014) the 2009–2011 RSP. I only analyzed 
FAA data from five airports: ATL, ORD, LAX, DFW, and DEN. This data collection 
process did not vary from the process stated in Chapter 3. 
Preanalysis Data Cleaning 
The original dataset consisted of 8,196 cases. I assessed these for inclusion 
criteria: occurring 3 years before or after the 2009–2011 RSP and occurring at the ATL, 
ORD, LAX, DFW, or DEN airports. I removed a total of 1,133 cases for not meeting the 
date requirement and removed a total of 6,639 cases for not meeting the location 
requirement. The analysis then involved an assessment of outliers using the guidelines 
put forth by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). I created standardized scores and removed any 
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cases falling outside of ±3.29 standard deviations, considered outliers. A total of 13 cases 
were removed as outliers, which consequently removed the entire potential Cat. A 
incursions from the data. This left a final dataset of 411 cases for analyses.  
Table 2  
Frequencies and Percentages of Type, Severity, and Phase of Incursion 
Variable n % 
Type 
  
OD 0 0.0 
OE 61 14.8 
OTH 67 16.3 
PD 200 48.7 
V/PD 83 20.2 
Severity   
Cat A 0 0.0 
Cat B 7 1.7 
Cat C 176 42.8 
Cat D 137 33.3 
N/A 91 22.1 
Phase   
Taxi 259 63.0 
Takeoff 42 10.2 
Landing 69 16.8 
N/A 41 10.0 
 




Of the final 411 cases, a large proportion were classified as PD (n = 200, 
48.70%). Lesser amounts were classified as OE (n = 61, 14.8%), OTH (n = 67, 16.3%), 
or V/PD (n = 83, 20.2%). Most occurred during the taxiing phase (n = 259, 63.00%), 
although 10.2% occurred during takeoff, 16.8% occurred during landing, and 10.0% did 
not apply to the allotted categories. The most frequently reported severity level was Cat. 
C (n = 176, 42.80%), with none in Cat. A, 1.7% in Cat. B, and 33.3% in Cat. D. Aside 
from these categories, 22.1% did not fall into the allotted categories. Table 2 presents all 
frequencies and deviations.  
Summary of Findings 
I assessed results of the analyses of Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the 
chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests used to answer these questions. The chi-square 
analysis used to answer Research Question 1 indicated a statistically significant 
relationship between the type of incursion and time of occurrence, where more total 
incursions were reported postprogram. However, fewer OE type incursions occurred 
postprogram and slightly fewer V/PD type incursions occurred postprogram. The Mann-
Whitney U analysis used to test Research Question 2 identified a statistically significant 
difference in severity of runway incursions based on whether incursions were taken from 
a group before or after the 2009–2011 RSP, with higher severity before the 2009-2011 
RSP. The final chi-square analysis conducted on Research Question 3 indicated that there 
was no statistically significant relationship between the phase of flight of the runway 




To assess external validity of the sample, I compared demographics of the sample 
to those of the population. For the type of runway incursion, PD represented the highest 
number of incursions (63.4%). V/PD (24.2%) was the second highest type of incursion, 
followed by OE (5.2%) and OTH (7.2%). The severity of the incursions from the sample 
was slightly different from the population with Cat. D (62.4%) having more than Cat. C 
(36.7%), but Cat. B (0.9%) still shows the least amount of incursions. Finally, the phase 
of flight of the runway incursions was also similar to those from the population. 
Specifically, TX (63.5%) had the highest percentage, followed by LNDG (20.9%) and 
T/O (15.6%). Overall, the sample was representative of the population. 
Results 
Research Question 1 
 I conducted a 2x5 chi-square test of independence to examine whether runway 
incursion type and time of program were independent. Two levels in time existed: 
preprogram and postprogram. Five levels in type of runway incursion existed: V/PD, PD, 
OTH, OE, and OD. Prior to conducting the analysis, I assessed the assumption of 
adequate cell size, which requires all cells to have expected values higher than 0 and 80% 
of cells to have expected values of at least five (Howell, 2013). All cells had expected 
values higher than 0, indicating the first condition was met. A total of 100% of the cells 
had expected frequencies of at least five, indicating the second condition was met.  
 The overall results of the chi-square test were significant, χ2(4) = 104.07, p < 
.001, indicating that a significant relationship existed between the type of runway 
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incursions preprogram verses postprogram (time). As such, the null hypothesis for 
Research Question 1 was rejected. Overall, more total incursions were reported 
postprogram (n = 232, 56.40%) than preprogram (n = 179, 43.60%). However, fewer OE 
type incursions occurred postprogram (n = 8, 1.90%) when compared to preprogram (n = 
53, 12.90%), and slightly fewer V/PD type incursions occurred postprogram (n = 46, 
11.20%) versus preprogram (n = 37, 9.00%). Therefore, significantly fewer OE and V/PD 
incursions occurred, but significantly more PD (n = 120, 29.20%) and OTH (n = 67, 
16.3%) incursions occurred after the program. Table 3 presents the results of this 
analysis. 
Table 3  
Results of the Chi-Square Analysis Comparing Type of Incursion by Time of Occurrence 
 Time 
 Pre-program Post-program 
Type n % of total n  % of total 
     
OE 53 12.9 8 1.9 
OTH 0 0.0 67 16.3 
PD 80 19.5 120 29.2 
V/PD 46 11.2 37 9.0 
OD 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 179 43.6 232 56.4 
 
Note. χ2(4) = 104.07, p < .001.  
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Research Question 2 
I conducted a Mann-Whitney U two-sample rank-sum test to examine whether 
significant differences existed in the severity of runway incursions before and after the 
2009–2011 RSP. The Mann-Whitney U two-sample rank-sum test is a nonparametric 
alternative to the independent samples t-test and does not share the independent samples 
t-test’s distributional assumptions (Lehmann, 2006). In all, I gathered 128 observations in 
Group 1 (preprogram), 192 observations in Group 2 (postprogram), and 91 classified as 
NA. The results of the Mann-Whitney U Test were significant, U = 15091.5, z = -3.98, p 
< .001. The mean rank for Group 1 was 182.40, and the mean rank for Group 2 was 
145.90. The distribution of the severity of runway incursions for Group 1 was 
significantly different from the distribution of the severity of runway incursions for 
Group 2. The severity of the runway incursions was significantly lower postprogram than 
it was preprogram. Table 4 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney U Test. 
Table 4  
Mann-Whitney U Test for Severity of Runway Incursion by Time of Occurrence 
 1 2    
Variable Mean Rank Mean Rank U z p 
Severity 182.40 145.90 15091.5 -3.98 < .001 
 
 
Research Question 3 
I conducted a 2x3 chi-square test of independence to examine the relationship of 
phase of flight of the runway incursions and time of the program. The two levels in time 
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were preprogram and postprogram. The three levels in phase of flight of the runway 
incursions were taxiing (TX), take-off (T/O), and landing (LNDG). Prior to conducting 
the analysis, I assessed the assumption of adequate cell size, which requires all cells to 
have expected values higher than 0 and 80% of cells to have expected values of at least 
five (Howell, 2013). All cells had expected values higher than 0, indicating the first 
condition was met. A total of 100% of the cells had expected frequencies of at least five, 
indicating the second condition was also met. 
 The results of the chi-square test were not significant, χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097, 
suggesting that independence could not be ruled out as an explanatory mechanism for the 
relationship between phase of flight of the runway incursions and time (preprogram 
verses postprogram) of the RSP. The observed frequencies were not significantly 
different from the expected frequencies. As such, the null hypothesis for Research 
Question 3 could not be rejected. Table 5 presents the results of the chi-square test for 




Table 5  
Results of the Chi-Square Analysis Comparing Phase of Flight and Time of Occurrence 
 Time 
 Pre-program Post-program 
Flight Phase n % of total n  % of total 
     
Taxiing 108 29.2 151 40.8 
Takeoff 25 6.8 17 4.6 
Landing 31 8.4 38 10.3 
Total 164 44.3 206 55.7 
 
Note. χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter included descriptive statistics along with a summary and a detailed 
analysis of the results for each of the research questions in this study. To assess Research 
Question 1, I performed a chi-square analysis and found it to be significant. The results of 
this analysis suggested a significant relationship between the types of runway incursions 
occurring preprogram and postprogram. I further established that significantly more 
runway incursions occurred postprogram compared to preprogram. To assess Research 
Question 2, I performed a Mann-Whitney U test, and I found that a significant difference 
existed between preprogram and postprogram severity of runway incursions. To assess 
Research Question 3, I performed a second chi-square analysis and found it to be not 
significant. No statistically significant association existed between the phases of flight of 
the runway incursions preprogram verses postprogram.  
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The next chapter includes a discussion of these findings and their interpretations 
in the context of this study and existing literature. I address implications for social 
change, recommendations for action, and recommendations for future research studies in 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 Through this study, I focused on determining the effectiveness of the FAA 2009–
2011 RSP at the nation’s five busiest airports. Runway incursions have been an 
increasing threat because of projected increases in air traffic within the United States and 
throughout the world (FAA, 2015). The FAA designed the RSP for the purpose of 
reducing runway incursions and increasing aviation safety throughout the NAS (FAA, 
2002, 2008). Whether the FAA RSP has been effectively reducing runway incursion was 
a question that needed to be answered. I answered this question by comparing the types, 
severity, and phase of flight of runway incursions from 3 years before and after the RSP 
at the nation’s five busiest airports. Through this quantitative study, I sought to draw a 
correlation between runway incursions’ type, severity, and phase of flight at these five 
airports preprogram versus postprogram, thus providing a more focused picture of the 
effect of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP.  
 I explored the following research questions: (a) is there a relationship between the 
types of runway incursions that occur on the runway before and after the 2009–2011 
RSP? (b) is there a relationship between the severity of runway incursions before and 
after the 2009–2011 RSP? and (c) is there a relationship between the phase of flight when 
the runway incursion occurred before and after the 2009–2011 RSP? Several key findings 
emerged from this study. The first finding was that a significant relationship existed 
between the types of runway incursions that occur on the runway before and after the 
2009–2011 RSP. The second finding was that significant differences existed between the 
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severity of runway incursions that occurred before verses after the 2009–2011 RSP. 
Lastly, no statistically significant relationship existed between the phases of flight when 
the runway incursions occurred before and after the RSP. 
 This study filled a gap in the literature associated with runway incursions because 
I analyzed runway incursions from more than just a numerical perspective. Instead, I 
considered runway incursions regarding the type, severity, and when, during the phase of 
flight, the runway incursion occurred. Because of this study, an improved understanding 
exists regarding the relationships between these variables. Additionally, I established a 
more detailed picture of the effect of the FAA 2009–2011 RSP, which can assist decision 
makers in modifying the RSP to enhance its overall effectiveness.  
 Consistent with the underlying theoretical base, the use of a comparative group 
(Holland, 1986; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), interrupted time-series design (Henry, 
2010) helped to analyze the runway incursion data in a manner that allowed me to answer 
the research questions. I highlight the causal results (impact) that the FAA 2009–2011 
RSP had on reducing runway incursions and increasing aviation safety within the NAS.   
 In previous runway incursion and aviation safety literature, researchers 
predominately studied runway incursions by categorizing these instances into their 
component parts and then analyzing these parts to better understand their relationship to 
one another as well as seeking methods to reduce their number and severity. 
Governmental organizations, aviation stakeholders, and academics have attempted to 
discuss runway incursions in terms of their inherent risk to the NAS. These researchers 
explored communication problems (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004) and 
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focused on human factors (Chang & Wong, 2012; Rantanen et al., 2006) as well as 
organizational structures issues (Adam et al., 2002; ICAO, 2002; Rogerson & Lambert, 
2012) to develop recommendations useful for reducing runway incursions. Other 
researchers have studied the best technological advancements that can be introduced at 
airports and used by pilots to enhance safety (Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld & 
Moller, 2012), such as RIPAS and RIAAS (NASA, 2005), which would assist in 
decreasing the number of runway incursions and their precursor events (Schonefeld & 
Moller, 2012). The FAA (2009) has also emphasized the importance of timely 
implementation of runway safety-enhancing technologies (ASDE-X, FAROS, and 
RWSL), at the nation’s five busiest airports as well as a number of other airports 
throughout the country.  
 The findings resulting from this research study supplement the existing literature 
and provide increased insights into which methods implemented by the FAA have had 
the most significant effect at reducing runway incursions. The results of this study will 
help FAA decision makers and other stakeholders establish a deeper understanding of the 
effectiveness of technological and other methods for reducing runway incursions. This 
knowledge will assist those charged with improving aviation safety throughout the world 
to improve their aviation safety programs. Ensuring that aviation is globally safer for all 
the flying public and the many others in the aviation industry will increase aviation 
operations worldwide and thereby encourage positive social change. As public 
administrators work to create and improve policies designed to enhance aviation safety 
for the public (Lowi et al., 2015), the results of this research study allow these 
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administrators to focus their attention on those methods that will most likely have the 
most significant effect on improving aviation safety in the NAS and throughout the 
world.   
Interpretation of Findings 
 This research study’s findings and resulting interpretations are important when 
considering how to improve the FAA RSP in future years. All aviation safety 
stakeholders must work collaboratively to reduce runway incursions throughout the 
world. Though this study only pertained to runway incursions at the five busiest U.S. 
airports, the results are applicable to airports throughout the world and provide a deeper 
understanding of which methods most effectively reduce runway incursions. Through 
collaborative efforts, aviation safety stakeholders can work to develop methods, 
techniques, and procedures that will have the most significant influence on reducing the 
frequency and severity of runway incursions.  
 Before discussing each of the research questions in this study, understanding the 
descriptive statistics relating to the final dataset of 411 cases used in the analysis was 
important. The total number of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports 
increased from 179 (preprogram) to 232 (postprogram). If a positive effect had resulted 
from the implementation of technological advances and improvements designed to reduce 
runway incursions at the nations’ five busiest airports, a reduction in the total number of 
runway incursions would have been expected. The fact that more runway incursions are 
happening after the RSP is of concern and requires a deeper inquiry into the underlying 
nature and circumstances of these incursions.  
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Research Question 1 
 Research Question 1 addressed the relationship between the types of runway 
incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. I analyzed five types of 
runway incursion: V/PD, PD, OE, OD, and OTH. If the RSP had been effective at 
reducing runway incursions, a difference in the types of runway incursions would be 
expected. Additionally, analyzing the numbers of different types of runway incursions 
before and after the RSP provides insights into any influence the RSP had on reducing 
these types of runway incursions preprogram verses postprogram.  
 The chi-square analysis used to answer Research Question 1 determined that a 
significant relationship existed between the types of runway incursions occurring before 
and after the RSP. The overall results of the chi-square test were significant, χ2(4) = 
104.07, p < .001, indicating that a relationship existed between the types of runway 
incursions preprogram verses postprogram existed. Although the overall number of 
runway incursions increased preprogram to postprogram, fewer OE type incursions 
occurred postprogram (n = 8, 1.9%) when compared to preprogram (n = 53, 12.9%). 
Table 3 from Chapter 4 presents the full breakdown of Research Question 1 results from 
the chi-square analysis comparing the type of incursion and time of its occurrence. The 
fact that a reduction in OE (air traffic controller errors) occurred, while a corresponding 
increase in the total number of runway incursions postprogram was significant, suggests 
that the methods implemented by the RSP to reduce this type of runway incursion are 




 Runway incursions are fairly frequent as a topic within the larger body of 
knowledge regarding flight safety literature (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004; 
Horowitz & Santos, 2009; ICAO, 2002). Researchers have concluded that major airports 
in the United States operate with unacceptable levels of risk because of their inherent 
potential for runway incursions and their failure to adequately address these safety 
concerns (ALPA, 2007; NTSB, 2010). This is partly why the FAA adopted the RSP as a 
means of diminishing instances of runway incursions (Skorupski, 2010). Because of the 
significant exposure that could result from an aviation accident, safety has remained an 
essential component in air transportation (Skorupski, 2010). As a part of the RSP, the 
FAA amended Code of Federal Regulations §91.129(i), requiring that all aircraft runway 
crossings be authorized only by ATC instructions or clearances (NTSB, 2000). The FAA 
also modified FAA Order 7110.65, which changed ATC procedures that required 
aircrafts crossing multiple runways to be issued ATC crossing instructions for each 
runway after the aircraft crossed the previous runway (NTSB, 2000, p. 16). These 
changes have had a positive influence in reducing OE at the five busiest airports in the 
nation and should be continued as it appears to be having a positive influence on reducing 
this type of runway incursion. Consistent with the reduction in OE type of runway 
incursions, the V/PD type of incursion also decreased from 11.2% (46 events) to 9.0% 
(37 events). This result was another positive indicator that the RSP has had a positive 
effective on reducing this type of runway incursions. The methods used by the RSP to 
help in the reduction of V/PD type of incursions should also be emphasized because it 
appears to be producing the desired outcome.  
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 However, the number of PD and OTH type of runway incursions increased 
significantly. This was supported by Schonefeld and Moller (2012), who asserted that 
even with RIPAS installations, there will still be risks to runway safety at various 
airports. Schonefeld and Moller (2012) reported that due to the expansion of commercial 
aviation into general aviation airports, the risk of runway incursions will continue to 
increase. This was seen within the current study, wherein the number of PD type of 
runway incursion increased by 9.7%, from 19.5 % (80 events) preprograms to 29.2% 
(120 events) postprogram. This finding is significant in that the methods used by the RSP 
to reduce the number of PD type runway incursions are not effectively working. This 
finding contradicts the findings of Jones and Young (2001), who posited that by being 
aware of the aircraft at an airport, having an accurate understanding of the route aircraft 
was directed to travel by ATC, and having the ability to effectively detect and correct 
route deviation, the RSP can assist pilots in avoiding runway incursions. These methods, 
which include educating, training, and establishing new procedures, do not appear to be 
reducing these type of runway incursions at the nation’s five business airports. As a 
larger number of less qualified pilots access these airports with the projected increase in 
aviation operations (FAA, 2015), the threat posed by PD type of runway incursions will 
likely increase significantly.  
 Also of concern is the fact that the OTH type of runway incursions has increased 
by 16.3%. A deeper understanding and analysis of these OTH types of runway incursions 
would be helpful in assisting the FAA with improving its RSP. Future researchers should 
consider exploring this phenomenon and provide information to the FAA and other 
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aviation safety stakeholders. The FAA will need to determine what can be changed 
within the RSP to increase the effect of the RSP and reduce these types of runway 
incursions. Previous to the establishment of the RSP, it was determined that runway 
incursions were most often caused by unreliability within the Automatic Dependency 
Surveillance-Broadcast and Traffic Information Broadcast traffic data (Cassell, 2005; 
Green, 2002; Jones & Young, 2001); however, the development of RSP was believed to 
be the correction to these problems (Jones & Prinzel, 2011). Rather, it has been 
established that even with the implementation of RSP, there are still outlying problems 
with runway incursions.  
 According to the results emerging from the analysis of Research Question 1, there 
was a significant relationship between the types of runway incursions occurring 
preprogram and postprogram. The RSP has not changed the types of runway incursions 
occurring at the nation’s five busiest airports. If the RSP had a positive effect on these 
types of runway incursions, significant differences between preprogram and postprogram 
RSP samples would be expected. The fact that this change did not occur is concerning 
and suggests that the FAA needs to improve its RSP.  
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 addressed the relationship between the severities of the 
runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. The results of 
this test showed that no statistically significantly relationship existed between the severity 
of the nature of runway incursions that occurred before the implementation of the RSP 
and those that occurred after the RSP.  
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Group 1 had 128 observations (preprogram), and Group 2 had 192 observations 
(postprogram). In addition, 91 observations were classified as NA. The results of the 
Mann-Whitney U test were significant, U = 15091.5, z = -3.98, p < .001. The mean rank 
for Group 1 was 182.40, and the mean rank for Group 2 was 145.90. The distribution of 
the severity of runway incursions for Group 1 was significantly different from the 
distribution of the severity of runway incursions for Group 2. The severity of the runway 
incursions was significantly lower postprogram than it was preprogram. The RSP has 
been effective in reducing the most severe of runway incursions at the nation’s five 
busiest airports. See Table 4 in Chapter 4 for the results of the Mann-Whitney U test for 
the severity of runway incursions by time of occurrence.  
The fact that the severity of the runway incursions for Group 1 was significantly 
different than the distribution for Group 2 is positive. One of the goals of the FAA RSP 
was to reduce the severity of the runway incursions from the more severe, Cat. A, to the 
less severe, Cat. D (FAA, 2008). The RSP has been successful in reducing the severity of 
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. All 13 of the Cat. A incursions 
were removed as outliers from the dataset, because they fell outside ±3.29 standard 
deviations (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The FAA 2009–2011 RSP has been effective at 
reducing the severity of runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. This is 
similar to the assertions of Schonefeld and Moller (2012) who purported that if RIPAS 
was to theoretically succeed, there would be a decrease in the number of runway 
incursions and the events leading to a potential runway incursion; but, a corresponding 
decrease in the severity of the runway incursion should also occur.  
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Managing risk and safety effectively is a practical problem, which has historically 
been addressed by examining the underlying causes of incidents and accidents, 
identifying the risks associated with them, and then determining appropriate safety 
standards consistent with socially acceptable values (Skorupski, 2010). Although I found 
that there was not a decrease in the number of runway incursions, there was a decrease in 
the severity of the reported runway incursions. This is because aircraft traffic relies on 
human decision-making, which can be disastrous if adequate information is not conveyed 
in time to the pilots (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). With the quality of information 
enhanced through technology, poor decisions can be minimized, thereby reducing the 
severity of runway incursions (Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). 
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 addressed the relationship between the phase of flight of 
runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. I analyzed TX, 
T/O, and LNDG preprogram verses postprogram in this chi-square analysis. The results 
of this test were not significant, χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097, suggesting that independence 
cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the relationship between phase of flight of the 
runway incursions and time (preprogram v. postprogram) of the RSP. The observed 
frequencies were not significantly different from the expected frequencies. See Table 5 in 
Chapter 4, which identifies the results of the chi-square analysis comparing phase of 
flight and time of the occurrence.  
The taxiing phase of flight for postprogram runway incursions increased from the 
preprogram occurrences by 12.6%. Before the RSP, 108 (29.2%) runway incursions 
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occurred during the taxiing phase of flight and 151 (40.8%) occurred after the RSP. The 
fact that a higher percentage of the runway incursions happened during the taxiing phase 
of the flight is a positive indicator that the RSP had a beneficial influence on reducing 
runway incursions. When runway incursions occur during the taxiing phase of a flight 
operation, an increased likelihood exists that any resulting injuries will be less severe and 
any resulting damage will be less substantial because lower speeds exist at the time of the 
impact. The number of runway incursions happening during the landing phase increased 
from 31 (8.4%) preprogram to 38 (10.3%) postprogram. Although the increase in total 
number of runway incursions occurring during the taxiing phase was a positive indicator 
and suggested an improvement in aviation safety, an increase in the number of incursions 
happening during the landing phase suggested a higher threat to aviation safety and 
increased risk to the flying public.  
On a positive note, a decrease occurred in the number of runway incursions 
happening during the takeoff phase of the flight. The results showed 25 (6.8%) 
preprogram runway incursions during the takeoff phase, compare to 17 (4.6%) 
postprogram. Because the takeoff phase of flight includes aircrafts operating at high rates 
of speed, a reduction of runway incursions during this critical phase of flight is 
significant. This result also suggests that the RSP has positively reduced runway 
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. It should be noted that the results of 
Research Question 3 did not have any relation to the previous findings reported within 
Chapter 2. An additional search of the preexisting literature also indicated that phase of 
flight and runway incursions occurring before and after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP, 
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including taxiing and landing, were not accounted for by previous researchers, indicating 
a need for further study in regards to runway incursions and phase of flight. This is 
necessary research that must be undertaken given the enormous risk that accompanies 
runway incursions during takeoff and landing, wherein pilots are often responsible not 
only for highly complex pieces of machinery, but also human lives.     
 In conclusion, the collective results from the three research questions established 
that the FAA 2009–2011 RSP had some influence in effectively reducing runway 
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports, but modifications need to occur to help 
improve the program’s overall reduction of runway incursions. The results from Research 
Question 1 raise concerns in light of the fact that the analysis determined a significant 
relationship existed between the types of runway incursions occurring before and after 
the RSP. Though OE and V/PD types of incursions decreased, a significant increase 
existed in the number of PD types of runway incursions postprogram. A substantial 
increase in the number of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions is serious and 
does not suggest that the RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s 
five busiest airports. Even though the findings establish a positive influence on reducing 
the severity of runway incursions, as well as a positive movement in the phase of flight 
from more hazardous to less hazardous, the significant correlation between the 
preprogram and postprogram types of runway incursions is of significant concern. These 
findings suggest that the FAA needs to modify the RSP to focus more of its attention on 
reducing the number of pilot deviations.  
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 The primary research question presented in this research study was whether the 
FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five 
busiest airports. Based on the research findings and their relevant interpretations, the 
ultimate finding is that the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has not effectively reduced runway 
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. The FAA needs to re-evaluate its RSP and 
explore additional ways to increase its overall influence, especially as it relates to 
reducing the number of runway incursions resulting from pilot deviations.  
Implications for Social Change 
The results of this research study have significant implications for positive social 
change locally, nationally and internationally. Though the FAA 2009–2011 has made 
some progress in effectively reducing runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest 
airports, the RSP has not effectively reduced runway incursions since the same types of 
runway incursions are occurring preprogram as compared to postprogram. Improving the 
RSP to address the increasing threat of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions 
and negatively affecting aviation safety is a significant concern that needs to be 
appropriately addressed to ensure the highest levels of aviation safety within the NAS. 
The findings from this study will have important influences on constructive modifications 
of the RSP, thereby substantially increasing aviation safety for all members of society 
and encouraging positive social change throughout the world.   
 On a local level, fewer runway incursions translate into less aircraft accidents on 
the many airports throughout the nation. A reduced number of aircraft accidents mean a 
safer working environment for airport employees and the many others who rely upon it 
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for a living. Though the nature of aviation has historically presented significant safety 
risks (FAA Flight Standards Service, 2012) and continues to be one of the most 
substantial risks that jeopardize aviation safety within the NAS (FAA, 2014d), reducing 
runway incursions and thereby decreasing the inherent safety risks associated with 
aviation directly benefits society.  
 A safer aviation environment will promote industrial growth throughout the world 
during the next several decades (FAA, 2015). As growth in aviation operations occur, the 
potential risk of a runway incursion also increases (FAA, 2013a). As larger numbers of 
people travel, both nationally and internationally, keeping these individuals safe is of 
primary importance for all governments (Lowi et al., 2015) as well as aviation 
stakeholders. With enhanced aviation safety, the overall costs of traveling decrease, 
which allows more people to travel by air and thereby stimulates the world’s economies 
by providing new opportunities for those employed or otherwise connected with the 
aviation industry (Air Transportation Action Group, 2014). Reducing the potential for 
runway incursions and enhancing aviation safety will help improve the inherent safety of 
air traffic operations throughout the world (FAA, 2014d).  
 Higher levels of safety will positively stimulate the growth of aviation activities, 
resulting in further economic expansion, thereby benefiting many individuals and 
developing countries worldwide. Improving the quality of life for members of a society 
through means of social, political, and economic modification supports positive social 
change. Developing a vibrant air traffic system within a country can have a positive 
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influence strengthening the infrastructure of a nation as well as helping maintain a more 
resilient economy (Air Transportation Action Group, 2016).   
 The FAA will use the findings from this study to successfully modify their RSP 
so that the program’s resources can be more efficiently allocated for the purpose of 
effectively reducing runway incursions not only at the five busiest U.S. airports, but also 
throughout the world. Improving aviation safety through the reduction of runway 
incursions and thereby increasing the inherent safety of aviation worldwide will result in 
positive social change for everyone.     
Recommendations for Action 
 Since the inception of the RSP in 2002, the FAA has focused its attention on 
reducing the number and severity of runway incursion within the United States (FAA, 
2008). Historically, air traffic accidents are generally a combination of different 
interrelated factors (Skorupski, 2010). How best to address this combination of factors 
that lead to runway incursions is a question that the FAA has struggled with when 
creating and subsequently modifying their RSP.  
 The findings from this research study established that the RSP has made some 
limited progress in achieving its safety goals and objectives, but needs to do more to 
effectively reduce runway incursions at the five busiest airports in the nation. This section 
addresses several recommendations for action within the context of this study, which 
could prove beneficial in the attainment of the FAA’s specified goals and objective for 
the RSP. While I viewed the FAA RSP in a theoretical context, it was determined that, 
theoretically, RSP is not as successful as it potentially could be, but is a step in the right 
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direction. This was determined within Research Question 3, wherein I determined that the 
FAA RSP has not worked effectively to reduce runway incursions during the landing 
phase. Instead, it was reported that runway incursions during the landing phase of flight 
actually increased 31 to 38, demonstrating a 1.9% increase. This is especially troubling 
given the fact that an increase in the number of incursions happening during the landing 
phase suggests a greater threat to aviation safety and increased risk to the flying public.   
 The FAA needs to reevaluate the way in which the RSP works to reduce runway 
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports and throughout the country. Several of 
these recommendations to improve the RSP are consistent with previous 
recommendations from organizations, such as the OIG and NTSB. In light of the 
increased number of pilot deviations resulting in runway incursions, the FAA should 
promote increased voluntary pilot participation in the Runway Incursion Information 
Evaluation Program (OIG, 2010). To date, the FAA has not taken an active lead in 
promoting the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program to pilots in order to 
collect and analyze more data to identify and mitigate runway incursion causal factors 
(OIG, 2010). If pilots are not encouraged to participate in these types of programs, the 
data necessary to establish a stronger connection with causal factors influencing is 
missing in the effort to reduce runway incursions. 
 The FAA needs to focus on the three factors that enhance a pilot’s ability to 
timely detect a potential runway incursion, which are an awareness of other traffic in the 
airport environment, a continuing awareness of the aircraft’s location in the airport 
environment, and the activity status of the operating runway (Jones & Young, 2001; 
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Schonefeld & Moller, 2012). Providing additional training and education to pilots is 
important if the FAA is going to effectively reduce runway incursions resulting from 
pilot deviations.  
 Also important is increased collaboration with the airline communities to establish 
a process whereby regional RSP managers would receive access to internal data on 
runway incursions and surface incidents, which will aid in identifying trends, underlying 
reasons, and possible local solutions to runway incursions. These solutions can be shared 
with other aviation safety stakeholders. Sharing local best practices successful in 
reducing runway incursions elsewhere throughout the NAS would be helpful in 
promoting enhanced aviation safety. 
 The FAA may also wish to implement increased training requirements for pilots 
desiring to conduct flight operations at a particular airport. During this enhanced training 
and consistent with an earlier OIG recommendation (OIG, 2010), the FAA should require 
a safety risk analysis to evaluate existing operational procedures at those airports where 
the FAA has identified potential runway safety risks. Consistent with the OIG’s 
recommendation (OIG, 2010), emphasis must be placed on increased collaboration 
between aviation industry stakeholders and encourage shared safety risk analysis. By 
promoting this approach, all the stakeholders share a common goal of working to reduce 
runway incursions at the nation’s airports. Ideally, this type of collaborative relationship 
will have a positive effect on reducing the number of runway incursions resulting from 
pilot deviations.  
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 With an increase in the number of taxiing related runway incursions, the FAA 
needs to take steps to minimize these risks. Previously, the GAO (2009) emphasized that 
the FAA should increase aviation oversight, especially of runway and ramp areas, 
through improved aviation safety data. As part of their recommendations, the GAO 
(2000) suggested implementing existing and current technologies while providing 
incentives for the acquisition of the latest technologies for airlines as well as enhancing 
runways and more effectively using advantages of NextGen technologies.  
  The FAA also needs to focus attention on reducing runway incursions through the 
effective deployment of technological advancements, such as RIPAS and RIAAS 
(NASA, 2005). These systems will assist pilots and others in avoiding runway incursions 
by providing them early warnings designed to avoid the events leading up to an 
incursion. Other researchers (Horowitz & Santos, 2009; Schonefeld & Moller, 2012) 
support the continued deployment of technological advancements throughout the NAS. 
These technological advancements would help provide operational information, while 
avoiding poor decisions that could lead to runway incursions. The FAA (2009) has 
previously expressed an interest in further developing and deploying runway safety-
enhancing technologies (ASDE-X, FAROS, and RWSL), but needs to do much more in 
this area, especially as air traffic within the NAS increases.  
 When considering the best ways to reduce runway incursions throughout the 
nation, the FAA needs to pay special attention to general aviation pilots to avoid runway 
incursions. The findings from this research study demonstrate that pilot deviations 
resulting in runway incursions are a significant aviation safety concern. Compared to 
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general aviation pilots, commercial pilots undergo more frequent training and are 
required to complete mandated proficiency checks prior to providing services for 
commercial operators, with most major airline carriers exceeding the minimum currency 
and training requirements (ALPA, 2011). In light of the findings of this research study, 
setting new training requirements for pilots especially regarding runway incursions 
should be a focus for the FAA as they reevaluate their RSP.  
 The FAA needs to continue its training programs for its air traffic controllers, 
which have resulted in a decrease in the number of operational errors previously 
occurring at the airports. Those methods designed to assist pilots also need to be 
enhanced. The FAA needs to focus on educating and training pilots. This education must 
be taken through the FAA and by all stakeholders, such as the airlines. The FAA must 
also encourage aviation safety stakeholders to work collaboratively to reduce runway 
incursions throughout the world. Increased cooperation with ICAO and other aviation 
organizations, such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Experimental 
Aircraft Association, can produce positive outcomes.   
 Additionally, The FAA should use it certification powers under Part 139 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. Part 139; FAA, 2016a) to require airports that 
conduct passenger-carrying operations to install technologic advances in order to promote 
a safer NAS. The FAA (2016a), through appropriate rulemaking, can require certain 
airports to be properly certificated and mandate that they meet established and stringent 
safety requirements (FAA, 2016a). When the FAA approves these requirements, the 
airports only legally operate commercial aircraft operations when they are in compliance. 
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Information resulting from this study will permit the FAA and its public administrators to 
increase as necessary the applicable standards under Part 139, thereby ensuring enhanced 
safety within the NAS. With an improved runway safety program, the number, types, and 
severity of runway incursions should decrease and the overall safety of the nation’s 
airports should increase, thereby making air transportation safer for the flying public. A 
worldwide reduction in runway incursions is critical in light of the forecasted growth in 
flight operations during the next several decades (FAA, 2015).  
 The FAA, foreign governments, and other aviation safety stakeholders should use 
the findings developed from this research study in improving their aviation safety 
programs designed to reduce runway incursions. By improving their runway safety 
programs, the overall safety of the air travel system throughout the world will improve, 
thus creating positive social change by enhancing human and social conditions relating to 
air travel. The findings from this study will be provided to the Runway Safety Team so 
they can use it to help improve the RSP and also provide critical safety information to 
pilots and the many others involved in the aviation industry.   
Limitations of the Study 
 There are several limitations associated with this study. This study focused on 
whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP has effectively reduced runway incursions at the five 
busiest U.S. airports. Limiting this study to the five busiest U.S. airports, decreases its 
applicability to general aviation airports where runway incursions are likely to occur. 
Generally, at the five busiest airports professional pilots are conducting large commercial 
aircraft operations carrying passengers and cargo. The type of flight operations, the 
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pilots’ proficiency levels, as well as the level of experience of air traffic controllers vary 
significantly from smaller general aviation airports. As such, the reasons for runway 
incursions at these smaller airports may be substantially different from those occurring at 
the nation’s five busiest airports. When seeking to reduce runway incursions throughout 
the U.S., understanding the factors affecting runway incursions at these general aviation 
airports is critical.   
 An additional limitation is that this study only relied upon three dependent 
variables, including type, severity and phase of flight of the runway incursion. There are 
a number of other factors that could also influence runway incursions, such as pilot 
experience, weather conditions, airport complexity, as well as aircraft type (Rogerson & 
Lambert, 2012). Each of these factors could have an influence on whether a runway 
incursion is more or less likely to occur at a particular airport. This study was narrowly 
focused and its results are most applicable to larger airports conducting commercial 
operations. A more robust study which analyzes a greater number of variables would be 
helpful in providing a more detailed image of runway incursions throughout the entire 
NAS.         
 Finally, this study was quantitative in nature and did not consider other qualitative 
factors that could provide a more detailed picture of runway incursions throughout the 
NAS. Since runway incursions occur as a result of many factors (Rogerson & Lambert, 
2012), truly understanding the reasons why runway incursions result from both the pilot 
and air traffic controller’s viewpoint would be very helpful to the FAA when designing a 
more effective RSP. In future research studies involving runway incursions, the 
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limitations inherent in this study could be overcome, thereby further enhancing the 
overall effectiveness of the RSP throughout the nation.   
Recommendations for Further Study 
 Based upon the findings from this research study, several recommendations for 
further study naturally emerge. Finding ways to improve aviation safety is a goal shared 
by all aviation stakeholders. Further studies can help in determining what works best 
when reducing runway incursions. These researchers can explore runway incursions 
beyond the five busiest airports in the nation and consider this important aviation safety 
issue at all airports in the United States and potentially throughout the world.  
 One of the pending issues that remains unanswered and merits more study 
involves reasons why highly qualified professional pilots are still involved in a significant 
number of runway incursions resulting from pilot deviations. Increasing the 
understanding in this area is important when seeking the best ways to help pilots avoid 
runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports in the nation and worldwide.  
Future researchers should conduct qualitative studies and incorporate surveys, focus 
groups, and other methods designed to explore reasons why highly qualified pilots are 
still having challenges with runway incursions. Findings from this study would assist in 
increasing knowledge regarding why pilot deviations are a growing cause of runway 
incursions at the five busiest U.S. airports. Also important for further study is a deeper 
understanding of the factors that encouraged a reduction in the number of operational 
errors by air traffic controllers. A qualitative study, including surveys and focus groups, 
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involving air traffic controllers would be helpful in developing useful information that 
answers this important question.  
 Additionally, expanding this research study to include a larger number of airports 
across the nation would provide additional findings that incorporate not only professional 
pilots in its analysis, but also less skilled general aviation pilots. This would further 
broaden the focus of the findings from this research study and provide additional 
guidance and information to assist the FAA, foreign governments, and aviation safety 
stakeholders in more effectively reducing runway incursions and enhancing aviation 
safety.  
 The implementation of NextGen and its resulting influence on runway incursions 
and aviation safety is also a significant factor that needs to be explored. In many respects, 
NextGen will make aviation operations less complex for commercial operations and more 
complex for general aviation enthusiasts who must learn to operate in this new 
environment (FAA, 2016b). As part of NextGen, the FAA and aviation stakeholders are 
encouraged to work together as part of the NextGen Advisory Committee to “identify 
high-benefit, high-readiness NextGen capabilities for implementation in the near term” 
(FAA, 2016b, p. 3). This future study would be helpful to develop findings that could 
assist in reducing runway incursions and improving aviation safety within the NAS.  
 Finally, the increasing integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), 
commonly referred to as drones, into the NAS is also a significant concern that could 
have a substantial effect on aviation safety. The FAA (2016c) expects UAS within the 
NAS to increase from 1.9 million in 2016 to approximately 4.3 million by 2020. 
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Meanwhile, commercial sales of UAS are forecasted to increase from 600,000 in 2016 to 
approximately 2.7 million by 2020 (FAA, 2016c, p. 1). Future researchers should focus 
on the potential influence of this rapid UAS integration into the NAS and its potential 
impact on aviation safety as well as its potential to negatively influence runway 
incursions. As UAS are likely to substantially increase within the NAS during the next 
several decades, research considering their influence on aviation safety as well as its 
implications on the efficient operation of the NAS is of critical importance. 
 In conclusion, several areas exist where additional research would be helpful in 
developing information that could improve aviation safety and have a positive effect on 
reducing runway incursions throughout the nation. With additional knowledge, the FAA, 
foreign governments, and all aviation safety stakeholders can stay focused on improving 
aviation safety throughout the NAS and the world.  
Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
 This chapter provided an interpretation of the results from the research study. It 
further addressed implications for social change and provided recommendations for 
future action and studies. The chapter served to clarify the results of this study within the 
context of aviation safety.  
 Runway incursions have been a serious problem jeopardizing aviation safety 
worldwide for decades. The FAA has worked diligently to decrease the number and 
severity of runway incursions since the implementation of the RSP. The research problem 
presented in this study was whether the FAA 2009–2011 RSP effectively reduced runway 
incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. I sought to determine whether the RSP was 
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effective in reducing runway incursions by examining their types, severity, and phases of 
flight using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the FAA 2009–2011 RSP. An 
analysis of the data produced established that although the RSP has made some progress, 
it has not effectively reduced runway incursions at the nation’s five busiest airports. 
Limited progress has been made to decrease the severity of runway incursions as well as 
positively influencing the phase of flight that incursions most often occur, but increased 
emphasis needs to be placed on decreasing pilot deviations within the NAS.  
 The FAA, foreign governments, and aviation stakeholders across the world should 
use the findings from this study to effectively modify future runway safety programs. By 
utilizing these findings, the number of runway incursions will decrease, thereby 
improving aviation safety for the flying public and assisting in the continued 
development of the aviation industry around the world. Through safer aviation, an 
increasing number of the world’s people will be able to enjoy aviation-related jobs and 
the aviation industry will continue its significant development for many years into the 
future. This results in positive social change for the many people throughout the world 
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